




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STUDIA SOPHOCLEA

PART I.

BEING

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

OF

PROFESSOR LEWIS CAMPBELL'S

EDITION OF SOPHOCLES.

BY

BENJAMIN HALL KENNEDY, D.D.

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

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INTRODUCTION.

AN adequate Edition of Sophocles remains yet to be achieved in England. I dedicate this volume to him who shall hereafter accomplish that task,

κεῖ μὴ δοκῶ τόδ' αὐτὸς ὄψεσθαι τέλος.

It is one which I would gladly have attempted, had the tenour of my life permitted: as this cannot be, I say with all my heart: *detur digniori*.

My present task is not an agreeable one. I do not undertake it for the purpose of upholding my own credit as a scholar. Had this been the sole or chief question, I could have been silent without reluctance. But for the right interpretation of Sophocles I feel some zeal: and some too for that which I hold to be a moral principle in editorial work, the doing justice to the worthy labours of preceding scholars, and, in doubtful passages, to all opinions and arguments which are fairly entitled to consideration. This principle has been confessedly set at nought by Prof. Campbell, in his Clarendon Press Edition of the three Theban plays; and I contend that, in ignoring it, he injures not only those whose names he has suppressed, but the interpretation of the poet, and the interests of those who use his book.

In my paper entitled 'Vindiciae Sophocleae,' I certainly expressed with unusual energy my confidence in the truth

of the three interpretations there defended. Yet Prof. Campbell would have done well had he resisted the temptation which has led him to twit me with assumed infallibility. Any candid reader may see that I claim nothing on the score of authority, but merely avow a conviction based upon the strength of reasons laid down. On the first and third passages (Oed. T. and Ant.) the argument appears to me 'totum teres atque rotundum,' conclusive on grounds of language, logic, dramatic fitness and poetic feeling. The passage of Oed. Col. is somewhat different. In this, language has less to do with the question; dramatic fitness and poetry, with logical considerations, have most weight. Here, while the external arguments are strong enough to determine my opinion, yet what crowns and assures my conviction, is poetic feeling. If I cannot succeed in imparting this to another mind, I disclaim all pretension to impose it as an article of faith.

Prof. Campbell's edition opens with an Introductory Essay on the Language of Sophocles. The preliminary portion of this Essay I have read with interest and not without profit. Essay-writing is his strong point. He writes with much ability, in free and flowing style; and if ever and anon I am encountered by that to which 'fine writing' on abstract subjects seems fatally liable — especially when it has been made a youthful exercise — I mean a certain haze or 'blendwerk' of words, through which the meaning looms indistinctly to the mental eye—I am quite aware that any of my readers may, if they think right, impute this to my lack of perspicacity rather than to Prof. Campbell's want of perspicuity.

Be that as it may, in the first three pages, and afterwards in sections 2 and 3, I meet with some phrases and some propositions, on the meaning of which I feel a sort of longing desire to cross-examine the writer: but it is in pp. 4 and 5 (section 1 from the beginning as far as 'intervening word') that I find myself most frequently mystified — I had almost written mistified.

Then, in p. 5, follows an admission which I have endorsed in my copy with the pencilled words 'hear! hear!' and which I heartily wish Prof. Campbell had borne in mind more constantly and more profitably. It is this:

"The acknowledgment of such an unfixed and growing condition of language may be thought to introduce unnecessarily into the study of Greek syntax an element of uncertainty. And it must be admitted that the attempt to trace constructions beyond grammatical rules is one which may easily degenerate into fanciful subtilties."

As a set-off to this admission, he goes on to urge (what I do not deny) that to require in Sophocles or Thucydides the exact articulation of perfectly grammatical writing would be mistaken exegesis. These citations indicate that, to a certain extent, we acknowledge common principles: but what follows will shew that, in the application of those principles, we diverge from one another very widely.

What I maintain, and, as I believe, what I prove (among other things) is, that in 'the attempt to trace constructions beyond grammatical rules,' Prof. Campbell does very often 'degenerate into fanciful subtilties,' nay more, into gross misconceptions. His hobby is, in some respects, a good one, but 'he rides it to death.'

In § 46, p. 78, he prints these 'Concluding Remarks on Grammatical Construction in Sophocles.'

"1. Sophocles has the keenest feeling for the analogies of language, but is not bound by fixed rules of grammar.

2. This subtle reflective tendency is perpetually causing slight modifications or extensions of idioms in ordinary use.

3. The overlogical spirit, or *κομπόρης*, of his day shows itself in various inversions, substitutions, and other indirect modes of expression.

4. Also in minute verbal parallelisms, antitheses, and paradoxes, which he generally manages, however, to make subordinate to the principal effect.

5. This analytical spirit is accompanied by a continual effort in the opposite direction of concentration (*διαίρεσις* and *συναγωγή*).

6. From both the last-mentioned causes there results a peculiar fulness and redundancy of expression, arising partly from the determination to be explicit, and partly from the combination and grouping of ideas.

7. The singularity of Sophocles consists not in any or all of these characteristics, which are in some degree common to his age, but in his subtle treatment of them, the harmony in which he binds them together, and, above all, the grace with which he adapts them to the dramatic expression of natural human feeling.

8. The interpreter of Sophocles must think more of the sequence of ideas than of the apparent grammatical connection of the words: and the critic of the text of Sophocles must ask, not, Is such and such a phrase exact in point of syntax? but, (1) Is it natural? (2) Is it poetical? (3) Is it dramatically adapted to the situation? (4) Is it Sophoclean?"

As to proposition 1, that 'Sophocles...is not bound by fixed rules of grammar,' see below, p. vii.

Propositions 2—6 consist of vague generalities which leave no clear impression on my mind: *κέντρον οὐκ ἐγκαταλείπουσι*.

Proposition 8 I regard as dangerously stated; and I find in its misapplication the probable cause which has led Prof. Campbell into so much erroneous exegesis.

I would move to amend it somewhat as follows:

"The interpreter of Sophocles must consider the sequence of ideas as well as the grammatical connection of words: and the critic of his text must ask not only whether such and such a phrase is exact in point of syntax, but also, Is it such as

Sophocles would be likely to use (1) generally, (2) in that particular situation?"

To the principle so modified I heartily subscribe, and I think it will be found that I apply it in my discussions.

A few words must be said on the proposition that 'Sophocles.....was not bound by fixed grammatical rules.'

Assuredly he was not. But this is true not of Sophocles and his age alone, but of the writers who went before and of those who followed him for more than 200 years.

For aught that Prof. Campbell's readers learn in p. 1 and elsewhere, they might suppose that, while the 'variety' of style in Sophocles and his contemporaries was due to the absence of 'fixed grammatical rules,' the contrasted 'sameness of Xenophon and the Athenian orators' in the next century¹ arose from the establishment of a code of grammar rules in the interval. But such was not the fact.

We are told that distinctions of gender were laid down by Protagoras, and we see them ridiculed by the comic poet Aristophanes. We find the rudiments of predication in the *ὄνομα* and *ῥῆμα* of Plato (Sophist. 262). We have traces of the principles of inflection in Aristotle (Top. vi. 4. Poet. 20); but the names of the parts of speech seem rightly ascribed to Chrysippus and the Stoic School in the 3rd century B.C. And as to Greek syntax, there is no reason to suppose that any scheme of rules was drawn up concerning it before the age of the Alexandrine grammarians B.C. 180; even if, then, the works of Aristarchus *περὶ ἀναλογίας* and of Crates *περὶ ἀνωμαλίας* were of this description. When we now speak of 'Greek Grammar,' we mean something much *wider* than the *γραμματική* of Plato and Aristotle, which was little more than what we call the knowledge of A, B, C: though we mean something far *less wide* than the *γραμματική* of Dionysius Hal., which included all

¹ These writers are not so uniformly smooth as is here suggested. Many instances of incomplete construction (*ἀνανταπόδοτον*) may be culled from their works. See Dem. in Boeot. de Dote, 1010 fin.

that is now called Classical Philology: a sense retained through a succession of ages down to the time when 'Grammar' Schools were founded to teach that branch of learning.

The Common-Law of language (*Sprachbewusstsein* in German), as spoken in his own country, and written in literary works, was that which each author followed, each having, no doubt, as Prof. Campbell rightly judges, his own idiotisms also.

What is that which we call Greek Grammar? It is a Digest of this Common-Law, drawn from the comparison of all Greek writings, and duly systematized. Certain rules of such a Digest we find to be generally obeyed by all Greek writers of all countries, times, and styles. Certain variations belong to certain countries, times, and styles; these are noted as dialectic. Some, it may be, characterize particular authors. These are noted as idiotisms. And so on.

But after all, the great Common-Law—this is Greek Grammar; and by the rules of this, *in the first place*, every construction of every writer ought to be tried, before we proceed to note and allow for and explain any striking variations.

The unsettled and transitional condition of Greek language in its most glorious age—that of Pericles—is, I think, stated by Prof. Campbell with undue exaggeration. The History of Thucydides does indeed exhibit the difficult struggle of a master-mind to acquire the yet unascertained tenour of a thoughtful Attic style. But then he had no models before him but a few Ionic chronicles, culminating in the great work of Herodotus. The poetic literature, language, and style of the Hellenic race had anteceded their prose writing by several centuries. Sophocles had a large treasure-house of epic, elegiac, iambic and lyric poetry to draw on, and in Attic style, he had his elders in dramatic art, Phrynichus, Choerilus, Aeschylus and others. His '*Sprachbewusstsein*' was, therefore, one of large extent. I have no doubt that he and all his literary contemporaries (writers and speakers) were deeply indebted for the improvement and settlement of language to the lectures of the much and unjustly

reviled 'Sophists,' especially to Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, and Gorgias; and to them it is, combined with the influence of the Socratic school, that I should ascribe the rhetorical fluency which marks the prose writers of the following century. That their criticism extended to poetry as well as prose, we cannot doubt. Philosophers (Empedocles for instance and Parmenides), like the Roman Lucretius afterwards, often consigned their doctrines to verse. And, in his Protagoras, Plato makes that Sophist invite a discussion respecting the sense to be ascribed to a song of Simonides, and express an opinion that knowledge of poetry is the most important branch of education. In this discussion (I. l. 205—220) the argument turns first on the *order* of words (in ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν the adverb being shewn to modify not the nearer word γενέσθαι but the more remote χαλεπὸν), afterwards on the *distinction* of words (γενέσθαι and εἶναι), a strong subject of Prodicus, who takes part in the Dialogue. Of syntax rules concerning case, tense, mood, &c., we find no trace; and we are bound to assume that all educated persons conformed on those points to the Common-Law, which, in Greek, was wide and flexible, allowing much scope for individuality.

If Prof. Campbell had been content with saying that there is more of idiotism in the constructions of Sophocles than in those of the other tragic poets, and had proceeded to notice these in their order, I should have approved his principle and procedure. But when he says that 'Soph. is not bound by fixed grammatical rules,' he represents him as a licenced violator of the Common-Law of language; and this supposed feature in his literary character Prof. Campbell is so enamoured of, that he searches out and seems almost to gloat over every construction, in which he finds, or fancies he finds, any trace of such violation.

This tendency of Prof. Campbell shews itself especially in the use, or, as I should say, the abuse of two favourite theories:

(1) The theory of double constructions.

When he perceives (or imagines) that a certain form of construction is capable of being assigned to one or other of two principles, as the weight of argument or of feeling may decide, his disposition is, either to ascribe it equally to both principles, or in a greater degree to the one, in a minor degree to the other.

This theory, which he is constantly striving to verify, has sometimes misled him, when he supposes an alternative that does not really exist; and, almost always, he ought to have made a choice between the alternatives, excluding one as the less probable. Examples of structure ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, pregnant construction, &c., are to be considered on their own merits.

This favourite crotchet has followed him from Plato to Sophocles.

Thus in Theaet. 148, on the words—προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν—he annotates, ‘ἐπιστήμης is governed partly by πέρι, but chiefly by λόγον.’

I protest against partition of government in a case like this (totally different from that of one object equally belonging to two verbs, as in ἔχω πεπονθὼς μαρτυρεῖν ὀνήσιμα). Ἐπιστήμης might be governed by πέρι or by λόγον, for λόγος περὶ ἐπιστήμης and λόγος ἐπιστήμης are equally good phrases: but it cannot be partly governed by the one, partly by the other. What then is the criterion? Looking at the passage, we see that Plato *could have* written τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἐπιστήμης πέρι, but he *has* written τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγον, whence I hold it just to infer that ἐπιστήμης here depends on λόγον, not on πέρι.

So in most of the Sophoclean passages which are explained by Prof. Campbell in this manner, as if the government were equally distributed to two words or phrases, the right principle is to decide in favour of one or the other; those instances alone excepted in which a word assigned to one government must be mentally supplied to another also.

(2). The theory of 'afterthoughts.'

I protest against this theory also, so far as it implies anything more than the acknowledged epexegetic idioms of Greek construction: and it does mean something far more than this in Professor Campbell's exegesis. If a word important to government happens to come somewhat late in a sentence (as in passages which will be cited), he always looks out for some other earlier government, which such word is to support as a subsequent auxiliary, an 'afterthought.' Now, a Greek poet of that age, Sophocles for instance, was not a scientific grammarian, it is true; because scientific grammar was itself an afterthought: but, like his contemporaries Pheidias, Polycletus and Zeuxis, he was a consummate artist. He had all the instincts of the imitator and the inventor; a full consciousness of the powers and properties of language as used by the poets and orators of his age. He was fully capable of choosing his words and phrases, and of assigning to them that order in his compositions, which the practice of speech, the emphases of expression, or the necessities of metre required. And there seems to me to be an inherent absurdity in the notion of a poet habitually carrying on one form of construction through the early part of a sentence, and then consciously supplanting or supplementing it by another. We find indeed certain confusions of construction in Sophocles, as elsewhere: but these we suppose to have been freedoms, either recognized by usage, or such as the poet himself was not afraid to adopt. For the power exercised by a Greek author in changing and developing language, as described by the sagacious Horace, applies not only to the coinage of words, and the variation of their forms and meanings, but likewise, in a great measure, to their construction and interdependence:

Dixeris egregie, notum si callida verbum
Reddiderit iunctura novum. Si forte necessest
Indiciis monstrare recentibus abdita rerum,

Fingere cinctutis non exaudita Cethegis
Continget, dabiturque licentia *sumpta pudenter*.

A. P. 47—51.

I need say nothing to prove what every scholar will at once acknowledge, that Greek and Latin poets (owing to the facility which inflection gives of recognizing the relations of words however disjoined) are able to use a freedom of collocation entirely denied to the languages of modern Europe. Let an example be taken from a Latin poet, Verg. Ecl. II. 12, 13.

At mecum, raucis, tua dum vestigia lustro,
Sole sub ardenti resonant arbusta cicadis.

“But while in lonely musing (mecum) I track your footsteps, the vineyard-trees under the fiery sun ring with croaking cicalas.”

The position of the epithet ‘raucis’ here, separating ‘mecum,’ from ‘lustro,’ and so far distant from its noun ‘cicadis,’ is audacious beyond all power of modern imitation.

Collocations of this daring nature are probably unknown to Greek epic poetry: but lyric and tragic poets do not shrink from them: and I think it nowise impossible that the remarkable passage Oed. T. 328—9 may be explained by the assumption that *εἴπω* is removed from its proper position after *οὐ μῆποτε* to one where it disjoins *ὥς ἂν* from its true connection with *μὴ...ἐκφύνω*¹.

Much more, when I observe a natural affinity of construction between words in a sentence, which are divided merely

¹ In Soph. Ant. 2, 3. I consider every attempt to explain the construction, while *ὅτι* or *ὅ τι* is read, a failure. I believe the true reading to be *τι*.

*ἄρ' οἷσθα τι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν
ὅποῖον οὐχὶ νῦν ἔτι ζῶσιν τελεῖ.*

‘Do you know any one of the evils derived from Oedipus which Zeus will not fulfil during our lifetime?’

The disjunction of *τελεῖ* from *Ζεὺς* is remarkable with any reading, but much more so when *τι* is read; and this feeling I suspect it was which caused the change to the inexplicable *ὅτι* or *ὅ τι*.

by distance, not, as in the places last cited, by distortion also, I lean to the belief that the poet's consciousness recognised such affinity from the first, and assigned to the earlier word that relation to the later, which, if they stood together, would not be disputed.

In illustration of my meaning I shall cite three places, respecting which I am inclined to differ not only from Prof. Campbell, but also from the higher authority (as I deem it) of Mr Jebb.

(1) Soph. Aj. 659. *γαίας ὀρύξας ἔνθα μή τις ὄψεται.*

On this Prof. Campbell writes: 'having dug it in earth where none may see:' where (he adds) 'the order shews that *γαίας* is only joined with *ἔνθα* by an afterthought.'

And Mr Jebb says: "Lit. 'having dug of the earth'—a partitive genitive. Cf. Thuc. II. 56, *τῆς γῆς ἔτεμον*. This seems preferable to making *γαίας* depend on *ἔνθα*."

If Mr Jebb had verified his quotation, he would have found that Thuc. writes *ἔτεμον τῆς γῆς τὴν πολλήν*, where *γῆς* depends on the words that follow it.

Each gen. is of course partitive in any case, nor do I deny that it is open to these scholars to construe as they do. But, for myself, I firmly believe that Sophocles wrote *γαίας* with the most entire consciousness that *ἔνθα* was coming, and that *ἔνθα γαίας* (like countless similar phrases) is an every-day construction. And when Prof. Campbell pleads the order of words in proof that dependence on *ἔνθα* is an afterthought (!!) of Sophocles, I should like to ask him whether the necessity of metre has nothing to do with poetic language, and whether inversion is not the most ordinary licence growing out of it. Suppose we render it in literal English, 'Digging of earth wherever none may see.' Surely 'of earth' would depend on 'wherever.'

(2) Soph. El. 1154. *ἧς ἐμοὶ σὺ πολλάκις
φήμας λάθρα προύπεμπες ὥς φανούμενος
τιμωρὸς αὐτός.*

‘Of whom you often sent me secret messages that you would yourself appear as the punisher.’

Prof. Campbell says: ‘the construction is aided by *τιμωρός*.’

Mr Jebb says, “About whom, with *φήμας προύπεμπες*,” adding that “*ἥς* at the same time depends, though less immediately, on *τιμωρός*, making the addition of *αὐτῆς* unnecessary.”

Here I emphatically differ from both. *Ἡς φήμας*, ‘messages about whom,’ I do not regard as very good Greek, considering that Clytemnestra, “about whom” the messages were, was at Mycenae with *Electra*, to whom they were sent, while Orestes, who sent them, was in Phocis. Add to which that I more than doubt whether ‘message’ can ever be a right rendering of the word *φήμη*. On the other hand, there is no doubt that *ἥς τιμωρός* is excellent Greek. Why then should not Sophocles have had from the beginning of the sentence the consciousness of the coming *τιμωρός*, on which the gen. *ἥς* would depend? Looking at the language, I regard the whole as a mere expansion of the proposition, *ἥς σὺ πολλάκις ἐπηγγέλλον μοι φανείσθαι τιμωρός αὐτός*. ‘As whose punisher you often promised me you would appear in person.’ He had caused such reports (*φήμας*) to reach Electra’s ear. I cannot but regret that in this place Mr Jebb should seem to lend the weight of his name to a notion of double construction which appears to me delusive and dangerous.

(3) In the third passage which I shall cite, his view is certainly tenable, and may be true, though the leaning of my mind towards a different principle makes me slow to accept it.

Soph. El. 78—9.

*καὶ μὴν θυρῶν ἔδοξα προσπόλων τινὸς
ὑποστενούσης ἔνδον αἰσθέσθαι, τέκνον.*

Prof. Campbell writes: “Here *θυρῶν* is first the ablative genitive, ‘from the doors,’ but as the thought becomes more definite the genitive is governed by *ἐνδον*, ‘within the doors.’”

I have already spoken of what I consider the 'inherent absurdity' of such a statement as this, which represents the poet's 'thought' as travelling within the space of a simple sentence from one degree of definiteness to another, and leading him to give a second and totally different principle of government to one and the same word.

Mr Jebb much more reasonably (for I assume that he treats *ἔνδον* as a mere adverb) says: "Join *θυρῶν* with *ὑποστενούσης*, 'at the doors.' The genitive can denote the quarter from which an object strikes the senses, though the object itself be stationary. Cf. v. 900...and Aesch. Ag. 1023."

This is true. Yet I prefer the natural government of *θυρῶν* by *ἔνδον* as a prep. 'Methought I heard some maiden faintly moaning inside the door.' I have never seen or heard any just argument invalidating the right of a classical poet to disjoin two words so related within a simple sentence. I am satisfied with feeling that the position of *θυρῶν* draws attention to it at once, and that its specific government follows. Mr Jebb himself refers it (as all must in some way) to *ὑποστενούσης*, and *ἔνδον* so closely follows this as to be truly a part of it.

In short, I regard the principle of exegesis, which I have opposed in the three places last cited, as a fanciful refinement, which I venture to believe that a *robust* scholar, such as Mr Jebb, will hereafter repudiate.

Among the numerous subdivided heads, under which Prof. Campbell exhibits the peculiarities of diction in Sophocles, he gives a very insignificant place to the suppression of clauses; merely citing two petty instances in p. 67. I (whose contributions to this subject he had settled to ignore) had ascribed to it signal importance, and drawn special attention to it in my Note on Oed. C. 308—9. See p. 9.

I will now cite another passage, from which I believe much difficulty will be removed by the recognition of a suppressed clause, and I shall shew how I consider that clause

indicated by the words of Sophocles. The passage to which I allude is the signally difficult one, Ant. 4—6:

οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐτ' ἀλγεινὸν οὐτ' ἄτης ἔχον
οὐτ' αἰσχρὸν οὐτ' ἄτιμόν ἐσθ' ὅποῖον οὐ
τῶν σῶν τε καμῶν οὐκ ὅπωπ' ἐγὼ κακῶν.

All I say about the principal clause is, that I think Prof. Campbell has done well in adopting the conjecture ἔχον for the manifestly corrupt ἄτερ, which never has been, and, I think, never can be rationally explained. My exegesis applies to the dependent clause ὅποῖον οὐ...κακῶν. Here I think the two negatives, on the assumption of a single verb ὅπωπα, quite indefensible; for the passage in Trach. 1013, cited by Prof. Campbell as parallel to it, is notoriously corrupt. Looking at this, and looking at the *single* pronoun ἐγὼ following the ἀρ' οἶσθα above, the νῶν, the τῶν σῶν τε, all which appeal to the consciousness of Ismene, I have not a shadow of doubt that the clause σὺ ὅπωπας is to be supplied mentally after τῶν σῶν τε, and that this was determined to the ear of an Athenian audience by the circumstances mentioned, perhaps also by the pauses and tones of the actor. Render: "There is nothing either painful, or &c., which you have not seen in your woes and I in mine¹."

¹ The necessity of explaining by reference to a suppressed clause is found even in the rhetorical and transparent style of Euripides. See Med. 209—13.

Κορίνθιαι γυναῖκες, ἐξήλθον δόμων
μή μοι τι μέμψησθ'· οἶδα γὰρ πολλοὺς βροτῶν
σεμνοὺς γεγῶτας, τοὺς μὲν ὀμμάτων ἄπο
τοὺς δ' ἐν θυραίοις, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἡσύχου ποδὸς
δύσκειαν ἐκτήσαντο καὶ ῥαθυμίαν.

I see but one way of interpreting this very difficult passage, and that is, by understanding δύσκειαν κτησαμένους (drawn from the last clause) with that which precedes, οἶδα πολλοὺς βροτῶν κ.τ.λ. "I know of many people, some within my personal observation, others that are strangers to me, who by a haughty bearing have gained ill repute, while others again, from a quiet manner, have earned the discredit of easy-tempered laziness."

Prof. Campbell's theory is specially set forth in his dissertation p. 61, under the heading of 'Double and Feeble Constructions.' He says:

"In the analysis of a Greek sentence, it is often difficult to determine with which of two words or clauses some word or clause is to be joined, and the true solution sometimes is, that it has an immediate connection with both. This is an example of a general phenomenon, the observation of which is especially important in the more minute study of Sophocles. The poet has two constructions or rather analogies in his mind, and instead of deciding upon one or other of them, as would be done by a writer of a grammatical age, he fuses both together, or allows the expression to waver between them. The well-known οἷσθ' ὥς ποίησον (O. T. 543), οἷσθ' ὥς...μὴ σφαλῆς (O. C. 75), are phrases obviously requiring some such explanation. The tendency is one which prevails widely in the Greek of this period, and has a proportionate effect on the subtle language of Sophocles."

The errors and dangers of this principle have been already exposed. As to the phrases cited, they are purely idiomatic, resembling the English 'please to tell me,' for 'tell me, if you please.' Οἷσθ' ὥς ποίησον, 'do—do you know how?' = 'shall I tell you what to do?' So the second phrase = 'shall I tell you how to avoid erring?'

Prof. Campbell then proceeds to cite a great many passages which he regards as examples of his theory. Some have been noticed by me already. They stand in 'most admired confusion,' though they ought to have been assorted and classified under many heads. Some of these I must distinguish, as admitted idioms of construction.

Thus (1) the structura ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, or zeugma, is justly exemplified in Oed. T. 792, 1335, Ant. 995.

(2) The pregnant use of prepositions appears in Aj. 345, 1551.

(3) Anacoluthon or licentious confusion of constructions occurs Oed. C. 385, Tr. 394, 1238, Ant. 21—22, El. 535.

In most of the other passages cited (some being omitted as unimportant) I dispute Prof. Campbell's exposition.

(α) Oed. T. 1117—18. *Λαΐου γὰρ ἦν*
 εἵπερ τις ἄλλος πιστὸς, ὥς νομεὺς ἀνὴρ.

'Here (says Prof. Campbell) *Λαΐου* is first put absolutely, but by an afterthought is governed by *νομεὺς ἀνὴρ*.'

Absolutely! afterthought! what marvellous exegesis! As if *Λαΐου ἦν*, with ellipsis of *δοῦλος*, were not a most ordinary construction. Render: 'he was a servant of Laius, faithful as any, for a shepherd.'

(β) Ant. 1057. *ἄρ' οἴσθα ταγοὺς ἔντας ἂν λέγῃς λέγων.*

"Ταγούς after *οἴσθα* and *λέγων*." C.

Not so. *Λέγων* after *οἴσθα*, and *ταγοὺς ὄντας* after *λέγων*. "Know you that of those who are rulers you are saying all you say?"

(γ) Aj. 2. *πεῖράν τιν' ἐχθρῶν ἀρπάσαι θηρώμενον.*

"Hunting for some adventure, to snatch some attempt upon thy foes. *πεῖρ.* after *ἀρπ.* and *θηρ.*, *ἀρπάσαι* epexegetic and also governed by *θηρ.*" C.

It would be difficult to put a case or to translate with less elegance. Yet substantially I agree that *ἀρπ.* is epex. and *πεῖραν* is ἀπὸ κοινοῦ: 'hunting for some attempt upon thy foes, to seize it.' Mr Jebb joins *θηρ. ἀρπ.*, and certainly this is possible; but *θηρᾶσθαι* oftener takes an accus.

(δ) Aj. 792—3. *οὐκ οἶδα τήν σήν πρᾶξιν, Αἴαντος δ' ὅτι,*
 θυραῖος εἵπερ ἐστίν, οὐ θαρσῶ πέρι.

"i. e. at once *οἶδα Αἴαντος (πέρι)* and *οὐ θαρσῶ Αἴαντος πέρι*: where note that the slight harshness of the ellipse in the first construction is softened by *πέρι*, which was necessary to the second." C.

This is truly *τερατώδες*. Mr Jebb writes:

'The construction first intended was *Αἴαντος δὲ πρᾶξιν οἶδα*

ὅτι κακὴ ἔσται, but for κακὴ ἔσται is substituted οὐ θαρσῶ περί, the preposition governing Αἴαντος.'

Am I wrong in thinking that a good scholar errs here from excess of ingenuity? It would seem that, if Soph. meant Αἴαντος to depend on *πρᾶξιν* understood, he would have written *σὴν μὲν πρᾶξιν*, not *τὴν σὴν*, which would rather call for *τὴν δ' Αἴαντος* as its antithesis. What objection has Mr Jebb to the simple construction, *οὐκ οἶδα τὴν σὴν πρᾶξιν*, (*οἶδα*) δὲ ὅτι Αἴαντος περί οὐ θαρσῶ, 'I know nothing about your case, but (I know) that about Ajax I am not easy'? Of course I understand Αἴαντος to be placed where it is in emphatic antithesis to *σὴν*.

- (ε) Phil. 380. καὶ ταῦτ', ἐπειδὴ καὶ λέγεις θρασυστομῶν,
οὐ μὴ ποτ' εἰς τὴν Σκῦρον ἐκπλευσης ἔχων.

"Ταῦτα probably in construction in different senses with λέγεις and ἔχων, i.e. ταῦτα is supplied as the object of λέγεις by an echo from καὶ ταῦτ'." C.

And this is Greek teaching—that ταῦτα, these *arms*, also becomes ταῦτα, these *words*, by an echo supplying an object to λέγεις, which wants no object. Quo tendimus ultra?

- (ζ) Tr. 4, 5. ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν ἐμόν...
ἔξοιδ' ἔχουσα δυστυχῇ τε καὶ βαρύν.

This citation has no just place here. Ἐχουσα depends on ἔξοιδα and has for its object τὸν ἐμόν αἰῶνα. 'I know that I have, &c.'

- (η) Tr. 164. χρόνον προτάξας ὡς τρίμηνον ἥνικα
χώρας ἀπείη κἀνιαύσιον βεβώς.

'Χρόνον after προτάξας, ἀπείη and βεβώς.' C.

Surely wrong. Χρόνον depends on προτάξας only; ἀπείη and βεβώς are in the relative clause with ἥνικα. Render: 'having fixed beforehand a term of 15 months during which he should be absent from the land after his departure.' The fact that ἥνικα = ὃν χρόνον (Accus. of duration), does not make χρόνον,

its antecedent in the text, depend on ἀπείη, and βεβώς is a clause in itself. The distorted position of κἀνιαύσιον is a good instance of the metrical necessity formerly alluded to.

I will not minutely examine the other places here cited. In Aj. 805—6, ἀγκῶνας depends simply on ἴοντες. In Ant. 520, λαχεῖν ἴσος is a brachylogy for ἴσος ὥστε λαχεῖν ἴσον. In Phil. 46, ἐλοιτο means ‘choose’ and this only. In Phil. 1032, 3, εὔξεσθε means ‘profess’ and this only.

I am unwilling to express any general opinion respecting Professor Campbell’s Dissertation on the Language of Sophocles. Some topics in it seem to me much better treated than others; and proceeding, as I now do, to criticize some particulars in its first pages, I think it only fair to say that the other cases are better treated than the genitive.

However it is the genitive that I am called upon to consider.

His Analysis of its uses is as follows:

“The genitive has two main significations, which are clearly distinguished, although in some instances they pass into each other, the ablative and the attributive. The former is gradually discarded, except with prepositions, and the case more and more assumes the character, to which it has been thought to owe the name γενικὴ πτώσις, denoting the kind to which a thing belongs, and thus tending always to express the wider of two conceptions. The connection between the governing noun, and the noun in the genitive by which it is included or determined, is sometimes so indefinite as to be extremely difficult to analyse.

“Common uses of the genitive are—

a. Ablative.

1. From.
2. Away from.

β. Attributive.

1. Possessive.
2. Objective.
3. Expressing simple relation, meaning ‘in respect of.’
4. Comparative.
5. Absolute.

- γ. Intermediate (explicable with reference to either of the two former uses).
1. Derivative.
 2. Genitive of material or contents.
 3. Partitive and Privative.
 4. Expressing Perception.
 5. Temporal.
 6. Causal.

It will be convenient to arrange under the above headings the characteristic or exceptional uses of the genitive in Sophocles."

A general distinction between the Ablative use and all other uses is just, but 'attributive' is a bad *inclusive* term for the others, and I prefer 'proprietary,' while I admit the difficulty of choice. (The possessor is proprietary of the possessed, the general of the special, the whole of the part, &c. Even the object may be said to appropriate, as it were, the action of the subject; but in no sense can it be called 'attributive.') The absolute genitive should be treated separately, being really an abbreviated clause, and falling under participial construction. The comparative gen., or standard of comparison, is justly placed under the ablative sense, as the 'point of departure.' Any genitive *rightly* described by the term 'derivative' I should rank as an ablative use; but such instances as *οὐσαν πατρὸς οὐ σὺ παῖς ἔφης* I would rather call 'possessive.' I should be pretty well satisfied with such a classification as the following:

- A. Ablative genitive.
 - α. Ablative proper (*from*).
 - β. Standard of comparison (*than*).
- B. Proprietary Genitive.
 - α. Subjective (*of*, rarely some other preposition)
 1. Possessive.
 2. Descriptive.
 3. Partitive (more correctly Partite).
 - β. Objective (various Prepositions).

I can afford neither time nor space to illustrate this outline by travelling through and exemplifying the numerous ramifications into which the most ductile of the Greek cases divides itself: but, having looked through the materials supplied in Rost's grammar, I find myself able (sometimes, I admit, by far-fetched relation) to refer all the instances there given to one or other of the heads set down, among which the Descriptive and Partitive uses are the most largely comprehensive.

I subjoin a few select examples of the manner in which the theory of the genitive is applied by Prof. Campbell—adding my own view within brackets.

(1). Ant. 153. 'Ο Θήβας ἐλελίχθων Βάκχιος—'the Theban Bacchus who shakes the ground:' [Θήβας really depends on ἐλελίχθων; 'earthshaker of Thebes'].

(2). Aj. 356. ἰὼ γένος ναῖτας ἀρωγὸν τέχνας, 'O ye who give your aid to the mariner's art,' or 'Oh helping crew of marine skill,' i.e. 'skilled by sea.' [If Prof. Campbell had confined himself to the former version, which is right enough, we should not have deemed him capable of suggesting the latter. Mr Jebb renders: 'Ye mates staunch in seacraft.']

(3). Ant. 1194. τί γάρ σε μαλθάσσοιμ' ἂν ὦν ἐς ὕστερον ψεύσται φανούμεθ';—'For why should I soften the word, when I shall hereafter be found false?' [Soften *the word!* then what of σέ? Render—For why should I soothe thee *with a tale*, of which hereafter I shall be found a false reporter?]

(4) Prof. Campbell quotes ὁμμάτων φόβον as a partitive construction, which it certainly is not, but descriptive, or even capable of being called possessive.

(5) Ant. 1265. ὦ μοι ἐμῶν ἀνολβα βουλευμάτων—'Me miserable in my counsels!' This (says Prof. Campbell) seems to be mixed of ὦ μοι ἐγὼ ἀνολβος τῶν βουλευμάτων (ἐνεκα) and

ὦ τὰ ἐμὰ ἄνολβα βουλευμάτα. [Mixed constructions require very careful handling, when we allow ourselves to suggest them. The first suggestion is quite untenable: for, if βουλευμάτων can be taken as gen. of cause, it must depend on ὦ μοι, and ἄνολβα must be imagined = ἄνολβα βεβουλευμένων, 'woe's me for my miserably planned counsels.' If the gen. depends on ἄνολβα, the rendering would be 'alas, the unblest instances of my counsels.' But I am inclined to think, without asserting positively, that ἀμαρτήματα is carried on from the beginning of Creon's speech, in which the third and fourth lines are merely parenthetic. In that case the version will be, 'Alas the unblest errors of my counsels!']

(6) O. T. 1006. σοῦ πρὸς δόμους ἐλθόντος εὖ πράξαιμί τι. 'That I might get some advantage from you, when you come home.' σοῦ genitive of cause: σοῦ ἐλθόντος gen. abs. [By *cause* I presume that 'author' or 'source' is meant. Both constructions cannot be right; and, as εὖ πράσσειν τινός is not Greek, the gen. is absolute and nothing else.]

(7) Ant. 1017. πλήρεις ὑπ' οἰάνων τε καὶ κυνῶν βορᾶς | τοῦ δυσμύρως πεπτῶτος Οἰδίπου γόνου. 'Infected through dogs and birds devouring of the unhappy fallen son of Oedipus.' Where note that the gen. γόνου is derivative after πλήρεις and also partitive with βορᾶς. [Without stopping to debate the propriety of this double assignment, I content myself with saying that the translation is certainly wrong for this reason, that βορὰ never has the active meaning 'devouring,' but only means what is devoured or to be devoured, especially 'flesh, meat,' &c. Again πλήρεις must have a case. Whether that case is βορᾶς or γόνου (taking βορᾶς with ὑπό) may be questioned. I have however little or no doubt that the former is right. Render: 'Tainted, through birds of prey and dogs, with flesh of the miserably fallen son of Oedipus.' And cp. Aesch. Ag. 1220, χεῖρας κρεῶν πλήθοντες οἰκείας βορᾶς.]

I now take a more limited specimen of Professor Campbell's analytical method. He writes :

“4. In the use of the genitive to express comparison two peculiarities deserve to be noticed.

a. When actions are compared, the genitive sometimes expresses by a condensation, not the action itself, but the subject or object of the action (as in the well-known Horatian instance, ‘Sanguine vipereo cautius vitat’).

O. T. 467. lyr. *ἀ. ἵππων σθεναρώτερον | φυγᾶ πόδα νομᾶν*—‘To ply in flight a swifter foot than stormswift steeds.’ O. C. 105. *μόχθοις λατρεύων τοῖς ὑπερτάτοις βροτῶν*—‘A slave to sufferings beyond all men.’ Ib. 568. *οὐδὲν πλέον μοι σοῦ*. Tr. 1273. lyr. *χαλεπώτατα δ’ οὖν ἀνδρῶν πάντων | τῷ τήνδ’ ἄτην ὑπέχοντι*. (Cp. O. C. 338. *τοῖς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ νόμοις | φύσιν κατεικασθέντε*.)

b. The genitive sometimes follows a verb in which some notion of comparison is implied.

El. 1262. *μεταβάλοιτ’ ἂν ὧδε σιγὰν λόγων*—‘Would thus be silent instead of speaking.’ Aj. 208. *τί δ’ ἐνῆλλαται τῆς ἡμέρας | νύξ ἥδε βάρος*—‘What change of grief has this night suffered, as compared with the daylight hour.’”

The errors of classification in the preceding extract are so various and so strangely mixed, that it is really a troublesome business to pick out and assort them.

In the first place (under *a*) two of the examples, the second and fourth, are not instances of the genitive expressing ‘comparison.’ Both are instances of the partitive genitive, and belong therefore to another head. The former of the two is a well-known brachylogy in superlative construction, where *βροτῶν* = *τῶν ἐν βροτοῖς* or *τῶν βροτοῖς τυχόντων*. The second may be similarly taken, if dependent on *χαλεπώτατα*, but it is quite as facile to make it depend on the phrase which follows, *τῷ τήνδ’ ἄτην ὑπέχοντι*. Putting aside, then, these two passages as, under the conditions of the heading, inappropriate, we find the writer professing to notice ‘two peculiarities’ ‘in the use of the genitive to express comparison.’ ‘When actions are compared’...he

begins. What does this mean? Let his examples be interrogated. The former of the two gives—‘to ply a swifter foot than stormswift steeds.’ Put this in the form of a simple sentence: ‘he plies a swifter foot than stormswift steeds’ = ‘he speeds more swiftly than horses.’ What are compared? Actions? No, there is one common action, ‘plies the foot,’ ‘speeds.’ The comparison is between ‘he (the murderer)’ and ‘horses;’ and the example, instead of a ‘peculiarity,’ is the very simplest form of such sentences: ‘*A* runs faster than *B*.’ We turn to the other example, which is, more fully cited, *τῆς ἐς αὐριον οὐδὲν πλέον μοι σοῦ μέτεστιν ἡμέρας*. Here we find the brachylogical idiom *σοῦ* for *ἣ σοι*, facilitated by the impersonal form *πλέον μοι σοῦ μέτεστιν*, which represents *πλέον ἐγὼ σοῦ ἔχω*, an ordinary construction. I find it hard to imagine the confusion of thought under which Prof. Campbell must have been labouring when he wrote the words “the genitive sometimes expresses, by a condensation, not the action itself, but the subject or object of the action, (as in the well-known Horatian instance ‘*sanguine viperino cautius vitat*’).” I might have guessed that the genitives after superlative words were floating before his mind, had he not quoted Horace. As it is, his words must be examined by the light of that quotation, which confines him to ‘the standard of comparison,’ the ablative-genitive. What then is peculiar in the Horatian instance, ‘*cur olivum sanguine viperino cautius vitat?*, *why does he shun olive-oil more warily than viper’s blood?*’ There is but one action, ‘shuns,’ and one subject, ‘he,’ but there are two objects, ‘olive oil,’ and ‘viper’s blood.’ The peculiarity (such as it is) has nothing to do with ‘action’ or ‘actions,’ nay, even this comparison of objects is not peculiar in itself (‘*petit mortem dedecore leviolem*’ compares objects without any peculiarity). The noticeable features are, that the comparison is made by an adverb, and that it has to choose between taking viper’s blood to be a subject or an object. If I write ‘*Amo te plus Bruto*,’ I write ambiguously; for the words may mean ‘I love you more than (I love) Brutus,’ or ‘I love you

more than Brutus (loves you).’ Therefore perspicuity requires ‘quam Brutum’ or ‘quam Brutus,’ according to the sense intended. But, in numerous instances, the reason of the thing leaves no doubt of the true meaning, and a poet therefore does not fetter himself by the rule of prose composition. In the passage of Horace, reason precludes ambiguity, as (conversely) when Juvenal writes ‘Ego possideo plus Pallante et Licinis.’ There is an evident analogy between the idioms σοῦ for ἡ σοι (so Ant. 75, τῶν ἐνθάδε for ἡ τοῖς ἐνθάδε), and ‘sanguine viperino’ for the more strictly legitimate ‘quam sanguinem viperinum.’ So far only does the Latin quotation illustrate the Greek examples; but the words which introduce it convey no just meaning to the mind.

Again, under *b*, Prof. Campbell says very truly, that ‘the genitive sometimes follows a verb in which some notion of comparison is implied.’ But he has not chosen the true examples of this government, such as οἱ φύσαντες ἡσσῶνται τέκνων, Fr.; γυναικὸς οὐδαμῶς ἡσσητέα, Ant. 678; νικᾷ γὰρ ἀρετὴ με τῆς ἐχθρᾶς πολὺ, Aj. 1357; τῶν φίλων νικώμενος, 1353; ὥς τῶν ὦν τέκνων λείποιτο... Tr. 266; τέχνη τέχνης ὑπερφέρουσα, Oed. T. 380, &c. The two examples which he gives of the thing for which *exchange* is made are distantly related to comparative construction, and may be referred to the ablative case: but they are not so clearly of comparative nature as those which I cite.

If I were to review all the passages in this Essay on which I differ from Prof. Campbell, I see enough to assure me that I should have to extend this Introduction considerably.

But, as respects his work, I have sought to prove two things, and, if I have said enough to do this, I am satisfied.

These are

(1) That the principle of editing, with commentary, any classic author, especially so difficult an author as Sophocles, without comparing the editor's judgments with those of other eminent scholars, at least on difficult points and passages, is a principle not less unwise than unjust, and such as ought to dis-entitle, a priori, an edition so executed to the confidence of teachers and students.

(2) That, if any scholar could be justified in placing his own judgments before the studious public in a manner thus authoritative and uncontrolled, Professor Campbell has not shewn himself to be such a scholar¹.

Besides this controversial purpose (which is forced upon me by the acts of Prof. Campbell himself), it is my wish to contribute something, which future editors may find useful, to the interpretation of him whom I consider as the first of Attic poets, and second as a dramatist to Shakspeare alone.

¹ I have had to challenge Prof. Campbell's grammatical accuracy in some fifty places. If in these he is right and I wrong, it must follow that, for sixty years, I have studied and taught Greek to little purpose; and that it behoves me to recast my knowledge—*γηράσκειν καὶ διδασκόμενον*—in the land of my ancestors, and in the city of its patron saint.

STUDIA SOPHOCLEA.

I. VINDICIAE SOPHOCLEAE.

(Partly reprinted from the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. iv., No. 8.)

WHEN Professor Lewis Campbell, of St Andrews, in 1871, published the first volume of his edition of Sophocles, containing the three Plays of the Theban Cycle, I found myself dissatisfied with many of his interpretations, and displeased by his method of omitting to record the opinions and contributions of other scholars, myself included. Hence I was led to criticise this edition in an article which appeared in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. iv., No. 8, and has received a reply from Professor Campbell, printed in the succeeding number. I now reprint my article, removing from it all merely personal matter, and I follow it with a rejoinder, in which what there is of personal matter relates principally to myself.

It is necessary to my present purpose that I should refer to my annotations on Sophocles. They appeared as far back as the year 1854, in Nos. II. and III. of 'the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology,' as Notes on Schneidewin's edition of the Oedipus Rex. Their main design was to shew the possibility of solving many difficulties of ancient literature, by applying to them a logical method of criticism: that is, by first observing what the nexus of thought in the place requires, and then carefully considering whether from the existing text the sense so required can be reasonably drawn. The manner

in which I had been led to the discovery of the proposed meaning in most of these places, itself affords some little presumption of that meaning being true. In the work of teaching, I had always deemed it a pleasure and a duty to make myself master of an author's train of thought, and, in expounding at the close of each lesson, to place this before the class in the clearest and most forcible language at my command. Hence it came that from time to time I found myself confronted by passages of which the received and *prima facie* interpretation was, in a logical point of view, very unsatisfactory to my judgment. For some time, I suppose, I got over them as well as I could; and occasionally, I dare say, I suppressed a difficulty which presented itself to me because I was not prepared with a solution. But such passages, as often as they occurred, left their sting behind: they worried me; they were revolved, brooded over: and the consequence was that, in many instances, the right solution came in upon my mind, like a lightning flash, when least expected. The first place of which I remember to have thus discovered the true sense by a sudden intuition, was Antig. 31, 2. The perception of Oed. T. 44, 5, came afterwards: later again that of Oed. T. 1085, 6, and yet later that of Oed. C. 308, 9, which I was extremely glad to have found out. With regard to all the interpretations here specified, having had more than twenty years in which to reconsider them, I am bound to say that my opinion remains unchanged: I have the fullest and firmest conviction that they are true, necessary, and unassailable by sound argument.

Before entering on a further examination of Prof. Campbell's commentary, I shall review the interpretation of three passages; so contrasting his method with mine, and enabling critical scholars to form their own judgment concerning them. I cannot however invite that judgment, without first placing my readers under a kind of mental engagement to disencumber themselves of all prejudice, especially of that subtle and prevailing prejudice against the New, so obstructive to all truth, which Horace bravely reprobates, Epist. II. 1. 75,

Indignor quicquam reprehendi non quia crasse
Compositum illepideve putetur, sed quia nuper,

and which Bacon has placed second among his 'Idols of the Tribe : ' Nov. Org. I. 46.

'Intellectus humanus in iis quae semel placuerunt (aut quia recepta sunt et credita aut quia delectant) alia etiam omnia trahit ad suffragationem et consensum cum illis : et licet maior sit instantiarum vis et copia, quae concurrunt in contrarium, tamen eas aut non observat aut contemnit aut distinguendo summovet et reicit, non sine magno et pernicioso praeiudicio, quo prioribus illis syllepsibus auctoritas maneat inviolata.'

'In regard to decisions once adopted, the human understanding (either because they are received and believed, or because they are pleasant) is apt to draw everything else into unison and agreement with them : and although the weight and number of the arguments on the opposite side be greater, yet it either does not observe these, or disdains them, or by some distinction sets them aside and rejects them, not without great and mischievous prejudice, in order that those former conclusions may keep their authority unimpaired.'

If this prejudice, as Bacon thinks, has so much influence in the sciences, where reasonings have generally the cogency which belongs either to experiment or to mathematical demonstration, much more must it operate in the interpretation of the ancient languages, which depends on a combination of linguistic skill, logic, and taste. Scholars are tempted to consider a new explanation of a well-known passage as a kind of personal affront. Why had it never occurred to themselves? Why, in the course of two thousand years, had it never been advanced by any commentator of any country? Why had it been left to a scholar of small note in the 19th century to detect what so many superior minds in so many successive generations had failed to see? And as no answer can be given to these really irrelevant, but only too natural questions, judgment is likely to go against a novel interpretation (*non quia crasse, sed quia nuper*) by virtue of the law which Bacon notes, because it threatens to break a Dagon or a Bel, before which a long line of commentators and translators have been content to bow.

I. The first passage of which I shall examine Prof. Campbell's version in comparison with mine, is Soph. Oed. R. 44, 5.

ὥς τοῖσιν ἐμπείροισι καὶ τὰς ξυμφορὰς
ζώσας ὁρῶ μάλιστα τῶν βουλευμάτων.

The view which I acquired of the true meaning of these lines grew, as I have intimated, out of a prior conviction that the ordinary rendering was logically poor and grammatically false.

The logical poverty must be shewn by observing the context; the grammatical falsity by contending that the uses of *καί*, *ζώσας*, and *ξυμφορὰς* in the usual version are unsatisfactory.

In the first place then I will state the substance of the Priest's speech up to these lines; adding, side by side, the two rival interpretations of them (C. and K.), with a few remarks; that the reader may thus discern to which side the balance of logical truth and poetic feeling inclines.

After describing the misery of the Thebans under the visitation of pestilence, the Priest goes on to say: 'We come as suppliants to your altars, Oedipus, not because we deem you a god; but considering you the first of men in all affairs human or divine. For you came to Thebes, a stranger, and relieved us from the sway of the Sphinx, by solving her riddle: this you did without any aid from us: you are believed to have saved us by divine inspiration. So now, most excellent Oedipus, we beseech you to find some help for us, whether suggested to you by the voice of a god, or, it may be (*πrou*), by a man: since...

C.

"I see that where men have experience, their counsels live and have a prosperous end."

K.

"I see that men of experience are also most accustomed to compare their counsels together."

Prof. Campbell adds: 'Oedipus had been tried in difficulty, and his advice, resting on experience, was the more likely to succeed. The simplicity of such a maxim is no objection to this rendering.'

The simplicity of a maxim is no objection to it, where it suits the context. Simple or not simple, it becomes objectionable where it produces disjointed thought, halting logic, and poetic bathos. Consider its effect more curtly thus :

Prof. Campbell's rendering gives this context :

‘Help us, Oedipus, thou that hast shewn superhuman skill. Find us help again now, whether shewn to you by a god, or perhaps by some man : since advice resting on experience is likely to succeed.’

How does he account for the bathos of this descent from a god to a man, from superhuman skill to experience ? And if the ‘advice resting on experience,’ is that of Oedipus himself, as Prof. Campbell thinks, is not the disparaging suggestion (ἐἴτ’ ἀπ’ ἀνδρὸς οἴσθ’ ἂν) worse than superfluous ?

My view gives :

‘Help us, Oedipus, thou that hast shewn superhuman skill : find us help again now, whether shewn to you by a god, or, perhaps (πou), by some man : since men of experience are those whom I see most in the habit of also comparing counsels with each other.’

The last clause conveys to Oedipus an excuse for the suggestion that such as he might possibly have learnt a mode of help from some man : and *ξυμφορὰὶ βουλευμάτων* is the substantival form of *ξυμφέρειν βουλεύματα*, which occurs in Aesch. Pers. 534.

Here the logical nexus is close and consistent : and quite in the manner of Sophocles.

Prof. Campbell says in a note : ‘it is not consistent with the laudatory tone of the address to Oedipus, who is the first of men, to advise him to take counsel with others.’ This is a remark somewhat surprising from an editor who has written a prefatory essay on ‘the Irony of Sophocles.’ In the first place, the priest gives no formal advice : he suggests the possibility that Oedipus may have profited by (οἴσθ’ ἂν) the advice of another man : and apologizes for this suggestion by a compliment to the eminent *ἐμπειρία* which would lead him to consult others. But why the digression at all ?

Why the alternative between *του θεῶν* and *ἀπ' ἀνδρός* which follows the request for help (*ἀλλήν τινα*)? The insight of Prof. Campbell has not enabled him to raise this question, much less to answer it. And yet he is not wrong in suggesting that advice is implied in the priest's words, though certainly not formally offered. All this belongs to the consummate skill with which the great dramatist has worked out his conception of the plot and of its central person. Oedipus is shewn in the first part of the play as a man of eminent abilities and noble aspirations, but of overweening self-confidence and fierce selfwill. These merits and these faults would be no secret to any of the Thebans, least of all to the chief minister of their religion, the priest of their chief god. From his mouth, therefore, the suggestion that Oedipus might already have profited by the counsel of another man (a suggestion for which the great poet makes the priest apologize by a graceful compliment) does in fact become a delicate admonition—an admonition not otherwise than 'consistent with the laudatory tone of the address,' but rather admirably supplementing and qualifying it. For if there is one virtue more than another recommended by the religious poets Aeschylus Sophocles and Pindar and by the religious historian Herodotus, that virtue is modesty, the violation of which draws down on the offender the *φθόνος θεῶν*, and thereby destruction. By whom was such a lesson more needed than by Oedipus? From whom could it come more fitly than from the priest of Zeus? How could it be conveyed more courteously than it is conveyed here? But while this is sufficient to account for the three digressive lines, I think still further reason of them can be rendered. The priest supposes a possible *θεοῦ φήμη* given to help the sufferers. 'Yes,' says Oedipus in his reply (v. 65—72), 'I have sought such aid: I have sent Creon to consult the Pythian oracle.' The oracle is brought, is reported: the suppliants quit the stage: the Theban Chorus enter the orchestra, and their first song is addressed to that oracle from which so much is expected. But has the priest's delicate admonition borne no fruit? It has not been unnoted by Oedipus. The oracle wants explanation. He has consulted his brother-in-law Creon, another *ἔμπειρος*, on this

difficulty: and by his advice he has sent for the seer Teiresias. See v. 288:

ἔπεμψα γὰρ Κρέοντος εἰπόντος διπλοῦς πομπούς...

How this momentary condescension of the arrogant prince leads to a new outbreak of selfwill, and brings him to the edge of the precipice, we all know. Thus then it appears that these three lines, so grievously misunderstood by Prof. Campbell, are nothing less than a studied and contrived link in the plot of this drama.

Having thus disposed of the logic of the passage, I go on to shew that the use of words is altogether on my side.

Prof. Campbell says: *καί* expresses "not only are the counsels good, but their issues are also good." But the question here is not between the morally good and the useful, but of the useful only; and good counsels are those and those alone of which the issues are good: so that the emphatically situated *καί*, from Prof. Campbell's point of view, loses all emphasis, and in fact he does omit it in his own translation.

Now for *ζώσας*. The verb *ζῆν* (see Liddell and Scott's Lexicon) is (1) 'to live;' (2) in a derived sense 'to be vigorous,' 'to abide;' whence it obviously may mean 'to be in lively operation' or 'use;' and this is the sense I give to it here. So once in Aeschylus, Ag. 793 ἄτης θύελλαι ζῶσι. In Sophocles, Antig. 457 οὐ γὰρ τι νῦν τε κάχθες ἀλλ' αἰεί ποτε ζῇ ταῦτα. Oed. T. 482 τὰ δ' αἰεί ζῶντα περιποτᾶται. But while even this derived sense is rare, I venture to say (until I am corrected by examples) that the sense of 'being successful,' as applied to men and their acts or counsels, never belongs to *ζῆν* in Greek literature. So that, instead of my interpretation 'increasing the difficulty of *ζώσας*,' as Prof. Campbell strangely says in his note, it retains, on the contrary, the derived use of *ζώσας*, as shewn above, while his sense of 'prospering' or 'being successful' is unsupported by instances. And when he renders 'live and have a prosperous issue,' he ought to be conscious that such rendering is merely delusive, seeing that, while 'live' is the literal representative of *ζώσας*, the words 'and have a prosperous issue' are gratuitously added, just to shew how *he* wishes the word 'live'

to be understood. In all the places he cites, *ζῆν* is 'to abide,' 'to be in force' or 'operation,' not 'to be successful.'

Finally, as matter of opinion, I do not believe that *συμφοραὶ βουλευμάτων* is a phrase which any Greek writer would have used to signify 'issues of counsels.' We find *συμφοραὶ κακῶν*, 'events consisting of evils' = 'evil issues:' *συμφοραὶ βίου*, 'events of life,' and once in Thucydides (I. 111) we have *τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων*, but how? in antithesis to *τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: πραγμάτων* being added to *συμφορὰς* (which a few lines before stands alone) to contrast 'actual events' with 'human feelings.' On this last passage I now cite Mr Shilleto's note. 'Interpreting here (see § 1) "events, issues, results," I disagree with such rendering of Soph. Oed. T. 44 *ὡς τοῖσι*.....I have long thought that "comparisons of counsels" was there meant, and have compared Aesch. Pers. 528. (I am rejoiced to find that Prof. Kennedy and I have independently arrived at the same conclusion...); *καί* seems thus to have more significance. Men of experience may receive suggestions not only from gods but from other men (*εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἰσθάπου*). Collations also of counsels are most effective.'

I too am glad that so great a scholar as my old friend should have reached independently the same conclusion as myself. But his last sentence I regret, as it seems to recognize that sense of *ζώσας* which I strenuously deprecate, and which, if admitted, would seriously interfere with the logic of the place. For it is not the *success* of compared counsels (except by implication), but the *practice* of comparing counsels which the priest ascribes to men of experience.

II. The next passage I refer to is Oed. C. 308, 9.

Oedipus, with his daughter Antigone, has taken refuge at Colonus, near Athens, within the grove of the Furies. Discovered there by the men of Colonus, of whom the Chorus consist, they are warned to depart, but appeal against the warning to the prince of the land, Theseus. The Chorus say he has been sent for, and will soon arrive. Then Oedipus speaks the two lines which will be found below.

I shall cite at full (1) my remarks in the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, II. p. 133, and (2) Professor Campbell's note on this passage, so far as it bears on the question at issue.

(1) I say:

‘Sophocles especially delights in that σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαίνον which consists in adapting the tenour of his thoughts and language to suppressed clauses, which the mind must supply from the context. All poets claim this licence more or less; but none, I believe, has used it so largely and boldly as Sophocles. A striking instance is found in the following passage of the Oedipus Coloneus, which scholiasts and editors have hitherto failed to understand:

ἀλλ' εὐτυχὴς ἵκοιτο τῇ θ' αὐτοῦ πόλει
ἐμοί τε. τίς γὰρ ἐσθλὸς οὐχ αὐτῷ φίλος;

‘Hermann, Wunder, Schneidewin and others have committed the aesthetical sin of referring the latter clause to ἐμοί, and thus putting in the mouth of the Sophoclean Oedipus a maxim more fit for the Bagstocks and Bounderbys of Mr C. Dickens, that “every good man studies his own interest.” By referring the latter words to a suppressed clause, which the context suggests, we obtain the just and beautiful sentiment embodied in the following interpretation: “May he come fraught with blessing to his own city and to me:—to himself I need not say:—for what good man is not a blessing to himself?”’

(2) Prof. Campbell writes as follows:

‘Well, may he come, and in his coming bless his own city as well as me; for what good man is not a friend to himself, i. e. who does not befriend himself in doing good?.....For αὐτῷ referring to αὐτοῦ the more remote antecedent.....see p. 71.’—

I can accept Prof. Campbell's *translation* almost as readily as my own, for in general drift it is really the same. But he gives a different turn to it by the manner in which he would explain the reference of αὐτῷ. He condemns, as I do, the odious saying ascribed here to Oedipus, that every good man loves himself. But he fritters away the signal beauty which belongs to the passage as explained above by me; and his reference of αὐτῷ to

τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει involves, I think, a defect of logical precision. I feel that the truth of my view might well be left to rest on the strength of its inherent merit alone: the more so, as Prof. Campbell has not attempted to offer any objection to it: and I am unable to see any which can be offered. The use of γάρ renders *some* mental supplement *inevitable*; and none is simpler and easier than what I have given. Let us see.—

If Sophocles meant to express by αὐτῷ nothing more than is contained in τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, why did he make the reference so much more difficult by writing the lines as they stand, when he could so easily have written

ἀλλ' εὐτυχὴς ἐμοί τε τῇ θ' αὐτοῦ πόλει
ἵκοιτο. τίς γὰρ ἐσθλὸς οὐχ αὐτῷ φίλος?

For the sake of emphasis, as Prof. Campbell seems to suggest in p. 71. It is impossible to perceive any gain of emphasis from such inversion. Prof. Campbell cites other passages in which, he says, the order of natural sequence is inverted. Not one of these supports his argument: they only shew $b + a$ where (perhaps) $a + b$ might be expected: but none $b + a + b'$ where $a + b + b'$ might be expected. But, waiving this point, or rather supposing even that Sophocles had written in the order last suggested, Prof. Campbell's case breaks down for a reason which he has quite overlooked. The first clause is a *wish* or *prayer*, 'may he come.' And the next begins with *for*. It is not, then, the ground of a fact which the second clause gives; as if the proposition were 'he *will* come with good fortune to his own city; *for* what good man is not a blessing to himself?' Such a meaning Prof. Campbell can obtain only by referring γάρ to a suppressed clause (καὶ εὐτυχὴς ἀφίξεται). 'May he come with blessing...and he will so come:—for &c.' Thus he cannot escape from the necessity of a mental supplement: but this he has failed to perceive. The supplement given above is the very least required for the mere purpose of explaining γάρ on Prof. Campbell's hypothesis. But in truth something more must be mentally supplied to complete the sense: namely, that being a friend to his own city is the same thing as being a friend to himself.

To sum up: Prof. Campbell's exegesis seems to me capable of being reduced to this:

'I wish that Theseus may come with good fortune to his city and to me; and the reason why I express that wish is, that every good man is a blessing to himself.'

My version is:

'I wish that Theseus may come with good fortune to his city and to me, (then instead of adding *αὐτῷ τε*, "and to himself," he substitutes an exquisite compliment)...for what good man is not a blessing to *himself*?'

'Look upon this presentment and on that.'

III. The third passage on which I have to compare the views of Prof. Campbell and myself is Antig. 31, 2.

On this I wrote (Journal of Cl. and S. Philol. II. 232):

'In his collocation of words or (as old grammarians would say) in his use of the figure Hyperbaton, Sophocles is more audacious than any other poet, especially where such freedom is in some degree licensed by the mysterious or impassioned tone of the speaker...In the Classical Museum (Vol. VI. p. 6) appeared a new interpretation of Soph. Antig. 31, 32

*τοιαῦτά φασι τὸν ἀγαθὸν Κρέοντά σοι
κάμοί, λέγω γὰρ καμέ, κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν.*

'Such is the proclamation which they say has been published by your good Creon, aye and mine, for I own I too thought him so.'

As in other instances, so in this, I was led to the new explanation by a strong feeling that any version, which should make *σοί* and *ἐμοί* dependent on *κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν*, is intolerable in more respects than one. I have not changed my opinion after reading Prof. Campbell's note, which is in its main features like that of Schneidewin.

It is this:

'These words have not been understood. Antigone first says, "There is Creon's proclamation for you" (*σοι* unemphatic), then, going off upon the word, For *you*, did I say? ay, and for me too,

for I count myself also among those forbidden. This is said with bitter emphasis, shewing that she has fully counted the cost of the act she meditates. "The proclamation extends to me—I accept the consequences."

If all this does not ring false to the mental ear of any scholar who looks at the Greek, the context, the characters and the circumstances, I cannot feel assured that my observations will convince him. Nevertheless I must try their effect.

In the first place then, I say that an unemphatic σοι here, such as Prof. Campbell (after Schneidewin) suggests, related to τοιαῦτα and to κηρίξαντ' ἔχειν, is impossible. It is too separate from the τοιαῦτα, which goes before it; and from the κηρύξαντα, which comes after it; above all, the presence of φασί forbids the very idea of any such dative. Compare the true unemphatic dative below v. 37, οὕτως ἔχει σοι ταῦτα, where no Greek author would have written οὕτω φασὶν ἔχειν σοι ταῦτα.

Other combinations were possible, which would have left no doubt that the datives were connected with τοιαῦτα κηρύξαντα. But, as the lines stand, I contend, and ever must contend, that they are shut out from both, and shut up to connexion with τὸν ἀγαθὸν Κρέοντα, if for no other reason, yet on account of the verb φασί, for (dismissing the notion of an unemphatic σοι in such a position) it is surely absurd to place in Antigone's mouth the language: 'such are the things which *they say* that the good Creon to you (or for you) and to me, yes, to me also, has proclaimed.'

Now let these lines be viewed by the light of their context.

Antigone (v. 19) has brought her sister Ismene out of the palace to talk with her. 'They report' (ὡς λέγουσι), she says (that is, a report has reached her from some attendant), 'that Creon has buried with due honours the corpse of Eteocles, but that *the citizens* have been forbidden by proclamation (ἀστοῖσι φασιν ἐκκεκηρῦχθαι) to bury Polynices...(Then follow the two lines). Such proclamation *they say* (φασι) that Creon has made... and *that he is coming hither* to publish it in plain terms *to such as know it not* (τοῖσι μὴ εἰδόσι).' What then is the position of the sisters? Antigone has heard a thing *reported*; Ismene had not heard it, but only learns it from her sister's mouth.

The report is of a proclamation made—to whom? Not to them, but *to the citizens*. They are women dwelling in the gynaeceum of the palace, who, in Creon's opinion, as in that of many modern Creons, have no right to meddle with public matters. He is coming, *the report* continues, to publish the proclamation again in front of the palace *to such as know it not* (this of course is the dramatist's device to bring Creon and his proclamation before the spectators in the second scene): but are the sisters of this number? Not at all. They have quitted the stage when Creon appears (v. 163), and before he has repeated his proclamation, Antigone has performed her brother's funeral rites (v. 223 &c.). In that proclamation he makes no allusion to the sisters, and, when he hears of the burial, instead of suspecting them, his suspicion is that the watchers had been bribed by some disaffected citizen to do the act (v. 290 &c.). With what shadow of propriety then can the proclamation be said to have been made *to* the sisters or *for* the sisters in any way? A fortiori; how can it be put in the form of a *report*: '*they say* that this proclamation has been made *to* (or *for*) you and me'? If ever sheer nonsense was suggested as the utterance of an ancient author, it is here. My own strong sense of this it was, as I before intimated, that led me to look for and discover the true meaning of the poet.

Finally, the explanation of *καῖμοί, λέγω γὰρ καῖμέ*, by Schneidewin and Prof. Campbell, is in violation of dramatic taste and propriety. While my version 'the Creon who was called good by you and by me, for I include myself also' (i.e. I too called him so)—contains a modest acknowledgment of error: the rendering—'the proclamation was made to you, ay, and to me, I say to me also'—which, so far as it has any meaning, must mean, that on one so sisterly, so devoted, so brave as Antigone, such a proclamation could have no deterring effect—this rendering contains an arrogant assumption of superior character, offensive in every way, and most so, when she would win Ismene to share her purpose: at the very least, it conveys an assumption of more intense feeling on her own part, which would be quite out of keeping at this point. If these considerations are not strong enough to induce scholars to disconnect these datives

from *κηρύξαντα* and to subordinate them to *ἀγαθόν*, I can urge none stronger. To me they are conclusive. The slight trajection by which *σοι* is separated from *ἀγαθόν* (*Κρέοντα* being between them), presents no real difficulty. Herein my opinion is confirmed by other scholars; for instance, by Prof. Evans of Durham, than whom none is more competent to decide such a point. The strictest grammatical position would be *τόν σοι ἀγαθόν* (*ὁ πᾶσι κλεινός*), but this may become *τόν ἀγαθόν σοί*, as witness *Trach.* 541, *ὁ πιστὸς ἡμῖν καὶ ἀγαθὸς καλούμενος*, and here, where the words which follow *σοι*, namely *κάμοί, λέγω γὰρ καμέ*, hang on to it of necessity, the further trajection of the pronoun beyond *Κρέοντα*, being unavoidable, becomes justifiable. Such trajections are found even in prose: as *Herod.* III. 88, *γάμους τε τοὺς πρώτους ἐγάμει Πέρσῃσι ὁ Δαρεῖος* for *τοὺς Πέρσῃσι πρώτους*. So *Aesch. Prom.* 939 *θῶπτε τὸν κρατοῦντ' αἰεί*, for *τὸν αἰὲ κρατοῦντα*.

II. A REJOINDER TO AN ARTICLE BY PROFESSOR CAMPBELL, printed in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. IV. No. 9, and entitled 'Dr Kennedy on Sophocles.'

IN this rejoinder I shall say as little as possible on personal matters, but a few words must be said.

Prof. Campbell is kind enough to recognize that in my article ('*Vindiciae Sophocleae*') I am good-natured, but he does not think me good-humoured; and in one place he speaks of 'the asperity of my resentment.' It is quite true that I did not write in a spirit of serene good humour. Literary warfare, as I said, is distasteful to me always: it is incalculably more so when it becomes at all personal. To prosecute a wrong-doer is an office I do not covet; to detract in any way from the reputation of an honourable man and a fellow-worker in the literary field, is a hateful task. I have not the advantage of knowing Professor Campbell otherwise than by some occasional literary

correspondence ; but his character, his attainments, his works, and his position entitle him to the high respect of scholars and gentlemen. It was therefore with pain inexpressible that I found myself compelled, by what I still consider the injudicious acts of commission and omission in his Sophoclean work, to impugn publicly both his ethical judgment as an editor and his critical judgment as a scholar. And I am not ashamed to own that the temper in which I addressed myself to a task so unpleasant was not one of cheerfulness and good humour. The more conscious I was of this feeling, the more earnestly anxious was I to say nothing more in disparagement of Prof. Campbell than the position in which I was placed seemed to render absolutely necessary. If I have written anything which to impartial scholars may seem at variance with this purpose, I regret the inadvertent error.

I found fault with Prof. Campbell on two general grounds, one of which is moral, the other intellectual in kind.

As to the former ground : Prof. Campbell, in passages requiring interpretation, explains as from his own mind, seldom mentioning the names of scholars by whom the place was first elucidated ; while, on the other hand, in disputed passages, he either takes a side without discussion, or briefly shelves a differing opinion, without giving the name or the full reasons of its advocate. This editorial plan I thought one 'not to be commended as worthy of imitation.' Had I been 'out-spoken,' I should have used terms of stronger disapproval. The Professor defends it at some length, partly on account of the restrictions under which he was laid by the Clarendon Press, but much more as having 'arisen out of a theory' which he himself holds. After reading his statement of that theory, I will only say that I dissent from it altogether, especially when adopted in a book of so much importance as to be issued in two thick octavo volumes from the Clarendon Press. It is unjust, in the first place, to scholars living and dead, many of whom may have made the interpretation of ancient authors their life-work. It is unjust in the next place to students, as it debars them from the knowledge of literary history and the exercise of critical judgment ; and as it confines them to the guidance of a

single editor, who may not in every instance be the safest authority. As to the plea of space, I think it may be shewn that in Prof. Campbell's edition room for the citation of names could easily have been gained by the omission or curtailment of superfluous notes; and, as regards the most difficult passages, I will not suppose that some pages for a few excursions at the end of the several plays would have been grudged by the delegates of the press. But only let us suppose a single page given at the end of the general preface to the names of scholars who have editorially or otherwise enriched the interpretation and illustration of Sophocles; and to each name one or more letters assigned as representing it. What amount of space would be occupied by adding to each explanation the initials (or other symbol) of its author, leaving it to be understood that all remarks not thus cited belong to the editor? For instance on the two verses Oed. T. 1084—5.

τοιόςδε δ' ἐκφῦς οὐκ ἂν ἐξέλθοιμ' ἔτι
ποτ' ἄλλος, ὥστε μὴ 'κμαθεῖν τουμὸν γένος.

we find the note:

'Being of such parentage, I have no fear of changing my estate, that would prevent me from inquiring fully into my birth.'

If Prof. Campbell had considered the principle which I advocate to be just and right, he might have included my name in a page with others more important, as one to whom the interpretation of the poet owes something, and have appended my initial K. (if that were my symbol) to the above explanation, as first given by me in 1854.'

The foregoing instance I cite because it is near at hand, apposite and illustrative, not for the sake of reclaiming my interpretation. An obliging passage in Prof. Campbell's article seems to indicate that he supposes me to lay great and needless stress on these Sophoclean questions as affecting my own credit as a scholar. I cordially thank him for this courtesy, which I cannot claim to have deserved at his hands, and which the nature of the case prevents me from requiting as I would wish. Γνωθι σεαυτὸν I grant to be the most difficult of attainments. Yet I think I can say, after strict self-search, that, if

Prof. Campbell had adopted *all* these interpretations without mention of their author, I might have disapproved his silence, but I should have borne it with much equanimity. I should not have troubled myself to claim my waifs and strays; I should have 'left them alone,' trusting that, like the sheep in the nursery ballad, they would 'soon come home, and bring their *tales* behind them.' If my principal motive in writing had been a personal one, my paper should have been called 'a self-vindication,' and not 'Vindiciae Sophocleae.'¹

But such was not its motive; nor is such the motive of its sequel now. My end and aim was—and is—to vindicate my favourite poet, to make clear his reasonableness, his consecutiveness, his aesthetic truth and beauty, all which were in my conviction injuriously obscured by the interpretations which Prof. Campbell has received in the three crucial passages. And here I would ask (for this striking and evidential circumstance the Professor has forborne to touch)—how came it to pass that I, who had read Sophocles several times before I went to college, who had read him again and again with private pupils and

¹ The note of Prof. Campbell which follows this is a fair example of those which might be clipt with advantage.

"1084. *ἔτι | ποτ' ἄλλος*] It must be admitted that *ποτέ*, beginning the line after a short syllable which precludes synaphea, is questionable. Qu. *ἐξέλθοιμ' ἐγώ*; see Aj. 986, *οὐχ ὅσον τάχος | δῆτ' αὐτὸν ἄξεις δεῦρο*; supr. 555, 6 *ἐπὶ | τὸν σεμνόμαντιν*. A point is lost by the conjecture *ἀλλός*'. The secret of the anomaly is probably the inverted order (for *ἄλλος ποτέ*) which is for the sake of emphasis and rhythm. Cp. Phil. 1217, *ἔτ' οὐδὲν εἰμί*."

Passing by the misaccentuation of the two last words, which should be *οὐδὲν εἰμι*, I find some strange utterances here. That which he says 'must be admitted' I deny. What is affected by 'a short syllable which precludes synaphea' I am at a loss to understand. All that is wanted to support *ποτε* at the beginning of the verse, if the poet does not shrink from placing it there, is that it shall follow the last word of the preceding line as if both were in prose, not in verse. And this it does; *οὐκ ἂν ἐξέλθοιμ' ἔτι ποτ' ἄλλος*. The sentence beginning, The secret, &c., is wonderful. Does Prof. Campbell seriously say that *ἔτι ἄλλος ποτέ* is the true Greek order, and *ἔτι ποτ' ἄλλος* only used for rhythm and emphasis? As to *ἀλλός*', it is precluded by the interpretation accepted above. The note might have been well condensed into some such form as this:

"Sophocles does not shrink from placing an enclitic here at the beginning of a verse, when duly constructed with the words which precede it. So the post-positive *δῆτα* in Aj. 986, *οὐχ ὅσον τάχος | δῆτ' αὐτὸν ἄξεις δεῦρο*; Cp. supr. 555, 6 *ἐπὶ | τὸν σεμνόμαντιν*."

with my Sixth Form, was haunted from earliest manhood by a painful sense of something wrong in the usual explanation of these places? How came it that, after my fortieth year, there flashed upon my mind, at intervals, those interpretations which, as soon as ever I perceived them, satisfied my craving instantly and finally, satisfied it so fully, that I pronounced them in my former paper, as I pronounce them again now, absolutely certain to my mind, so certain, that I would readily stake my credit as a scholar on the truth of each and all? *Πότερα μαινόμενος*; Prof. Campbell and his backers (one of whom he cites) will ask. Some excellent scholars I know there are—many I hope there are—who will be ready to answer with Prince Hoopoe, *Ἀφ᾽ατον ὡς φρόνιμος*. As to the Antigone passage, which was my first discovery, I had the pleasure at the time, some 27 or 28 years ago, to find myself in full agreement with my then colleague, who stands in the very first rank of our good Greek scholars, *τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου*, Professor Evans, of Durham. He had left Shrewsbury for Rugby before I found the key to the other passages, and I have not consulted him respecting them.

I now proceed to examine Professor Campbell's defence of his own views against the arguments of my Article.

I. Oed. Tyr. 44, 45.

Here I find it most convenient to compare,

First: our conflicting opinions about words and phrases.

Secondly: our conflicting opinions about the logical tenour and general interpretation of the two lines.

A. First then, as to words and phrases.

(1) *Τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν βουλευμάτων*. Prof. Campbell says:

'Now, does *τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν βουλευμάτων* mean "the habit of conferring counsels"? I do not say this is impossible. I am glad to own that in this and other instances Dr Kennedy shows an acute perception of the *fluxile* diction of Sophocles. But the word *ξυμφορὰ* in the sense of "event" is so extremely common, that strong reasons would be required for giving to it here a new *etymological* sense. And (although this is a matter of feeling) the phrase wears a strained and un-Sophoclean aspect.'

He here admits, somewhat grudgingly, that τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν βουλευμάτων in the sense of 'the habit of comparing counsels' is not impossible. No tolerable linguist could indeed venture to deny that, if συμφέρειν βουλευματα can mean (as it does in Aeschylus) 'conferre consilia,' αἱ συμφοραὶ τῶν βουλευμάτων can mean (where such meaning is required) 'collationes consiliorum.' He calls such use of ξυμφορὰ 'a new etymological sense.' I do not allow the fitness of this designation. The sense is etymologically inherent in the word, and is therefore not 'new' in itself, though it be applied in a way new to the reader. The correct statement is that such use is ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, an expression once found in the few remnants we possess of the wealthy tragic literature of Greece. We have plenty more ἅπαξ λεγόμενα of various kinds; and, when their inevitable meaning is recognized, they do not alarm us. My contention here is, that the meaning I give is inevitably required by all just considerations, and that I should not otherwise have been led to look for and to find it. Prof. Campbell sums up by saying, as a *feeling* of his own, that my sense of ξυμφορὰ is strained and un-Sophoclean. I can only reply that I have no such feeling: that συμφορὰ is, by admission, used in various shades of meaning; that if we had all the old Attic dramas in our hands, we might find many more peculiar uses of it: finally, that Plato's play on the word (συμπεφορημένη συμφορὰ) in the Philebus evidently recognizes the sense 'bringing-together.' But it must not be forgotten that, while I thus defend this version of the phrase τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν βουλευμάτων, I impugn that given by Prof. Campbell; and he has made no real defence. I ask for instances in which συμφορὰ with a genitive means the *result* or *issue* of an act expressed by the genitive. The only place advanced by him is that of Thuc. i. 140, ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἥσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, a comment on what was said just before, εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους...πρὸς τὰς ξυμφορὰς καὶ τὰς γνώμας τρεπομένους, where it is evident that τῶν πραγμάτων has the nature of a *descriptive* gen. (events in the realm of action) as opposed to τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (thoughts of the human mind). And this is the very place, in commenting on which Mr Shilleto pronounces in

favour of the view which I defend of the Sophoclean phrase. I urge, then, that this place does not bear out the affirmation, that αἱ ξυμφοραὶ τῶν βουλευμάτων can be used to express 'the results of counsels;' and that Prof. Campbell's account of the phrase is no more supported by parallel uses of συμφορὰ than mine is. See footnote on p. 31.

(2) Ζώσας. In rendering this word the choice, from my point of view, is a large one. 'Live,' 'are alive' would be tenable versions, but not à-la-mode; 'exist,' 'subsist,' 'remain,' 'prevail,' 'are usual (prevalent),' &c. &c.: any of these, and various other phrases would convey my meaning: the dictionary is 'all before me, where to choose.' But whichever I choose, Prof. Campbell's ultramontane strictness declares the choice a heresy in taste. Hear his sentence.

'Dr Kennedy lays great stress on ζώσας. He seems to imagine that because poets can speak of a storm, or a calamity, or the Eternal Laws, or the oracular voice from Pytho, as having life and power, therefore Sophocles, when he wanted to say calmly, "Wise men are wont to take counsel together," was capable of expressing himself thus, "The habit of comparing counsels *lives* amongst experienced men." He may find persons to agree with him, perhaps many: ἐγὼ δὲ εἰς ὧν οὐ ξυμφέρομαι. This would seem to me a trivial use of a rare and impressive metaphor. For I cannot persuade myself that the use of ζῆν in such passages is other than figurative, or that a *metaphor* so seldom employed has already passed into an ordinary prosaic word. I am unwilling to admit that the laws so finely personified in the Antigone are there only said to be "*in viridi observantiâ*," or that the "storms of calamity" in Aeschylus are merely spoken of as a "prevailing" wind. Something more is meant of the oracular voices in the Tyrannus than that they retain their accustomed value, something more of virtue in Euripides than that it remains in operation. Here is the gist of my remark, that Dr Kennedy's interpretation increases the difficulty of ζώσας.'

Prof. Campbell, I grant, excels in essay-writing. On discursive wings he soars aloft, and sails through the clouds gaily and gallantly,

τότε μὲν νοτίαν στείχων πρὸς ὀδόν,
τότε δ' αὖ βορέα σῶμα πελάζων,
ἀλίμενον αἰθέρος αὐλακα τέμνων.

Here I cannot compete with him. Neither at school nor at college, nor in the great field of journalism, has it been my lot to cultivate sedulously this potent art, which I admit to be ζῶσαν at the present time in either sense, both 'prevailing' and 'prosperous.' The θεῖον πάθος, the εὖροια, of which Plato speaks, is not mine. Even under the pressure of an adjuring Phaedrus, I should have been obliged to decline the myth, and to pass at once to the ἔλεγχος. But I do feel sorely tempted to diverge for a few moments, in all good nature and good humour, to τὸ τῶν κωμωδῶν φορτικὸν πρᾶγμα, though not exactly that 'Tu quoque,' which Phaedrus deprecates. There is indeed something in Prof. Campbell's argument here which strikes me as wonderfully comic. Ζῆν metaphorical he will have to be ζεῖν or nothing; cold or boiling-hot, never lukewarm. Ζῶν may have its quiet chrysalis sense of 'living' ('alive' and not dead); but let it pass into metaphor, and it must be 'all alive' (shall we say 'alive and kicking'?); there is no middle caterpillar state for it, it must become a brilliant dragon-fly, a peacock butterfly, or a death's head moth. Such intermediate uses as 'surviving,' 'abiding,' 'prevailing,' 'being usual,' and the like, must not be given to ζῶν, at least in the drama; some may allow them, perhaps many: but Professor Campbell εἰς ὧν οὐ ξυμφέρεται. The εἰς ὧν ought surely to be prophetic. Speaking seriously, this dictum of Prof. Campbell, this 'canon for the nonce' (to borrow his own term) has no just foundation. 'To live,' 'to be alive,' may be said in any language, in poetry or in prose, of a custom which still subsists and is not extinct. "The belief in fairies yet *lives* in parts of Devonshire." "The Keltic, though extinct in Cornwall, is a *living* language in Wales." "The custom of saying 'God bless you' to one who sneezes is still *alive* in some localities."

Again, I think Prof. Campbell deceives himself when he ascribes such ultra-vivacious vitality to the verb ζῆν in some of the metaphorical passages. He may be entitled to do this when in Oed. T. 482 it is said of the oracles that they ἀεὶ ζῶντα περιποτᾶται. But in Antig. 457 I contend that nothing stronger is found in the word ζῆ than that the laws *exist* (*abide*) continually, *the same* yesterday, to-day, and for ever. In Aesch. Ag. 793 ἄτης θύελλαι ζῶσι, the context proves that ζῶσι means no

more than *continue* (are not yet extinct): Troy is still (*νῦν ἔτι*) burning, after so long an interval, though the fires are fast dying out, *συνθνήσκουσα δὲ σποδὸς προπέμπει πίονας πλούτου πνοάς*. Finally I aver that the proposition which in my opinion the priest announces is not 'trivial' and 'prosaic,' but important and dignified enough to justify any metaphorical use of *ζῆν*. "Men of sage experience not only give counsel, but among them more than in any other class *exists* (*abides, flourishes*) also the habit of comparing counsels and conferring together." And, on the assumption that this is the right interpretation of the meaning, I ask what other participle than *ζώσας* would Prof. Campbell suggest to supply the sense required, metre not being considered. I can think of none.

We have next to consider the Professor's defence of his own version of *ζώσας*, 'live and have a prosperous issue.'

"I pass on to consider my interpretation of *ζώσας*. I have admitted in my notes that this word presents some difficulty under either interpretation. But I presume that if *ζῆν* can mean 'to be prosperous,' there is no great harshness in predicating this of actions as well as of persons, and of the results of actions as well as of the actions. Now I observe, first, that in each of the metaphorical uses of *ζῆν*, there is a slight shade of difference in the meaning, relative to the thing spoken of. The storms of calamity do not abate their violence, the oracles do not cease to threaten, the laws maintain their authority. Why may not the results of counsel 'prosper' or be full of success? [To the metaphorical uses of *ζῆν* should be added *El. 1419, ζῶσιν οἱ γᾶς ὑπαὶ κείμενοι. Trach. 1169, χρόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι καὶ παρόντι νῦν. Time is frequently personified in Sophocles. Fr. Inc. 717 (Nauck), ζῶντι ποδὶ χρώμενος.*]

"There is also an *emphatic* use of *ζῆν* which has not been sufficiently noticed. As applied to persons, it often approaches the significance of *εὖ ζῆν*, i. e. 'to enjoy the fulness of life.' I trace this shade of meaning with more or less of certainty in the following passages of Sophocles: *Dan. fr. vi. 171 Nauck, ζῆ, πῖνε, φέρβου. Fr. Inc. 753 Nauck, τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ ζῆν ἐστίν. Phil. 1021, σὺ μὲν γέγηθας ζῶν. Antig. 1169, καὶ ζῆ τύραννον σχῆμ' ἔχων. O. C. 1147, ζώσας, ἀκραιφνεῖς τῶν κατηπειλημένων. Trach. 235, ἰσχύοντά τε καὶ ζῶντα καὶ θάλλοντα. O. T. 1188, ὡς ὑμᾶς ἴσα καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ζώσας ἐναριθμῶ. El. 156, οἷα Χρυσόθεμις ζώει. ib. 456, ζῶντ' ἐπεμβῆναι ποδί. ib. 811, ζῶντα τιμωρόν.*

"When these two facts are connected, first that ζῆν has sometimes the figurative meaning 'to have power,' and this with various modifications; secondly, that ζῆν has often the *emphatic* meaning, 'to live successfully,' I do not feel much difficulty in interpreting the passage as I have done. For I do not admit that in joining τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν βουλευμάτων there is any difficulty at all, especially since the genitive is added after an interval to complete the expression. The passage in Thucydides is sufficiently parallel, and according to Dr Kennedy's own method the phrase may be resolved into τὰ βουλευματα αὐτοῖς ξυμφέρει (or ξυμφέρεται) ταύτη. And the ξυμφοραὶ may be said to 'live,' just as in El. 999, the δαίμων is said ἀπορρεῖν, 'to fade away.'"

If the argument, or rather, the shadow of an argument, used here, supported as it is, or as it is meant to be, by many irrelevant quotations, be capable of persuading any scholar that ζῶσας can mean 'live and have a prosperous issue,' what can I do? Simply shrug my shoulders, and take up my opponent's parable, οὐ ξυμφέρομαι, but I shall hardly add εἰς ὧν.

In the first place, I have to observe that the metaphorical uses of ζῆν additionally cited are on my side: 'they that are beneath the earth *exist* still (*survive* and are not dead):' 'the time which now *exists* and is present:' 'having a foot yet *in life*:' and all places, as those in Soph. El. (two are cited, 456 and 811), in which one supposed to have died is said to be still alive, have a like effect in establishing the sense of 'continuing to exist.'

Next: it will be seen in my Article, that 'I venture to say (until corrected by examples) the sense of being prosperous, as applied to men and their acts or counsels, never belongs to ζῆν in Greek literature.' Thus I virtually challenged Prof. Campbell to produce a single passage in which ζῆν so applied has the meaning of 'being successful,' 'having a prosperous issue.' Has he produced any? No, not one. What has he done, then? So far as I can discern, he has endeavoured to prove that

$$0 + 0 = \text{something.}$$

The first term on the left side of this equation is found in the question, If 'the storms do not abate their violence, the oracles do not cease to threaten, the laws maintain their

authority, why may not the results of counsel "prosper" or be full of success?' He has not studied Plato for nothing; but his reasonings here and afterwards remind me of Polus and Euthydemus more than of Socrates. The storms and oracles and laws, *whatever else they do* (for they may continue to do any number of things) have this one common predicate, they are *living*, and not dead. If Prof. Campbell meant to predicate of the results of counsels merely this—that they live and do not die out, I should have no case against him on the matter of ζώσας. But this is not his proposition. That results *live*, ay, have vigorous life, may be equally true of them, *whether good or bad*. He attempts to carry into ζώσας the further meaning, that they live *and are prosperous*. Here is his sophism, here the unsoundness of his reasoning. In his translation and note he carries it farther still: there it is said, '*the counsels live and have a prosperous issue*;' and '*not only are the counsels good, but their issues are also good*.' Yet there is no *goodness* or *prosperity* really predicated of τὰς ξυμφορὰς (but only that they are ζῶσαι *living and not dead*), and therefore there is none predicated of *counsels* by virtue of the καί.

Then, as his next term, Prof. Campbell brings to reinforce his assertion 'an emphatic use of ζῆν, which has not been sufficiently noticed.' 'As applied to persons,' he says, 'it often approaches the significance of εἶναι ζῆν, i.e. "to enjoy the fulness of life."' To confirm which he cites ten places of Sophocles. Now, if all these were really such as he states, there is one sufficient answer to all, namely, that *they are not said of counsels, plans, acts, &c. but of persons*, which is a totally different thing.

This being so, it is hardly worth while to discuss these places: yet I am unwilling to leave anything unsaid.

The emphatic uses of ζῆν (*vivere*, to live) are applied to persons only. To live a worthy—a useful—a vigorous life, to live through coming ages—these and other shades of intensity, may all be expressed occasionally by the single predicate of *living*. What need to cite examples of so trite a fact? Under ζῆν in the Tragic Indices they will be found abundantly, as under '*vivere*' in those of Latin poets. So much the more strange is it that, of the ten passages here cited by Prof. Campbell, in eight no

such idea as 'enjoying the fulness of life' is contained: it is possible only in the two fragments, and these require the context to determine the exact shade of sense belonging to this verb. [I observe, in passing, that the citation of Trach. 235 is fallacious, because Deianira had said *δίδαξον εἰ ζῶνθ' Ἡρακλέα προσδέξομαι*, and Lichas replies:

ἔγωγέ τοί σφ' ἔλειπον ἰσχύοντά τε
καὶ ζῶντα καὶ θάλλοντα κού νόσῳ βαρύν

'I left him not merely alive, but well and vigorous and free from sickness.' The two latter places of El. are fallacious for a reason already assigned. In the other passages, setting aside the fragments, life is predicated as existence only, the character of which depends on the context; and in two, O. T. and El., that character is the reverse of enjoyment and prosperity.]

And now, connecting these two terms (facts he calls them), which I have shewn to be irrelevant and impotent as proofs, 0 + 0, Prof. Campbell deduces his conclusion. He 'does not feel much difficulty in interpreting the passage' as he has done. He is thankful, it seems to me, for 'small mercies' here, *ζηλωτὸς οὐ τοῦ εὐστόχου ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὐθαρσοῦς*. Then he recurs to the phrase *τὰς ξ. τ. β.* in words which have to me a sphinx-like sound: and 'Davus sum non Oedipus.' Who has said that there is any difficulty in joining the words? Not I. Joined they must be, but in what sense is the question. That the passage of Thucydides is justly parallel to Prof. Campbell's version, I have questioned and do question. But what is meant by my 'method,' and by the words which are said to fall in with it, I have vainly tasked my brain to surmise. That 'results' may be said to 'live,' I have already allowed; that they may be said by the one word *ζώσας* to 'live and prosper,' I have denied, and still must deny.

(3) His difficulty of explaining the emphatic *καί*, Prof. Campbell glides over, as he says, *in transitu*. To this facile treatment of a most important point I cannot consent. How slight an impression it made on him was shewn by his omitting the word in his translation at first; nor does he even now correct that translation. He did indeed say: '*καί* expresses not

only are the counsels good but their issues are also good.' I withdraw nothing of what I said respecting the poorness of such a distinction: but I now add what I have lately shewn, that the idea of goodness is not contained in ζώσας, and that if it is not predicated of *the issues*, it cannot, by the ordinary laws of grammar, be reflected to *the counsels*.

But Prof. Campbell writes:

"I say that the simplicity of such a maxim is no objection to its use here, and I quote a sentence from Herodotus (who has so many correspondences with Sophocles) to the effect that 'likely plans are likely to succeed.' He distinguishes there between the likeliness of the plans, and the blessing of providence on them: and I maintain that no Greek of the 5th century B.C. would feel that there was anything strange in distinguishing between the wisdom or excellence of a plan and the happiness of its issue."

I made no objection to the maxim that '*experienced men are most successful in their plans*' on the score of 'simplicity,' and I must therefore say that the repetition of this term here can avail only to gain credit for a futile argument by giving it a taking but inappropriate name. In the place cited from Herodotus VIII. 60, it is not said in the words given, 'Likely plans are likely to succeed' (the double use of likely is an unwitting sophistication), but with the same sense, 'Likely (i.e. reasonable) plans are generally brought to bear:' nor is anything said of 'the blessing of providence upon them:' what follows is, 'if plans are not likely (i.e. reasonable), God will not come to the succour of human judgment.' This is a good text for Cromwell's sermon to his troops, 'Put your trust in God, my boys, and keep your powder dry:' but it affords no help to Prof. Campbell, *who must perforce have the same predicate for both clauses*, in order to gain the desired emphasis for καί.

To sum up this part of the question, Prof. Campbell and I are obliged to accept one and the same Greek exegesis; namely ὡς τοῖσιν ἐμπείροισι μάλιστα ζώσας ὁρῶ (οὐ μόνον τὰ βουλευμάτα ἀλλὰ) καὶ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν βουλευμάτων, which I explain 'since amongst experienced men above all others I see in use

(not only counsels but) also the comparisons of counsels:' while Prof. Campbell's version, thrown into the same order, will apparently become 'since in experienced men above all others I see prospering (not only their counsels but) also the issues of their counsels.' [The Professor will hardly object to this version of his version, for it puts his case as favourably as it can be put.] To this interpretation I oppose the arguments urged in my former paper and maintained here; among them this, that *ζώσας* cannot mean 'prospering' (or 'good' or 'successful') as applied to counsels and the like.

B. I pass now to the argument derived from the context, Prof. Campbell writes:

"Professor Kennedy dwells at length on three passages. The first of these is Oed. Tyr. 44, 45, which he interprets thus: 'I see that men of experience are also most accustomed to compare their counsels together.'

"1. I hold that this interpretation is frigid and out of place. It drops the tone of entreaty to introduce a parenthetical caution, so injuring the effect both of ll. 40—46, and ll. 47—51, and destroying the impressiveness of the transition to the tone of warning which I have noticed in l. 47. The caution itself is rudely inconsistent with the laudatory tone which is the key-note of ll. 33—46. Oedipus, who solved the riddle of the sphinx without information or suggestion from any Theban (ll. 37—39), is supposed to need 'comparison of counsels' with other minds before he can find help against the plague."

It is difficult to deal with an opponent so marvellously illogical and undiscerning. In the first place I deny the advocacy of any 'parenthetical caution.' I allege an excuse for the expression *εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἴσθα πού*, and I have explained (in no 'rudely inconsistent way' but by the strictest logical and æsthetic reasons) how this apology links itself to the conduct of the plot. And what does Prof. Campbell say? That Oedipus, the discoverer of the riddle, must not be supposed to need 'comparison of counsels'!! What then of *εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἴσθα*? what of the suggestion that 'he may have been taught by some man?' Is there no 'comparison of counsels' in that? The Professor himself supposes 'a covert reference to Teiresias' (of which

mistake I speak afterwards). If Oedipus consults Teiresias in order to obtain *ἀλκή*, I suppose he does thereby 'take counsel' with another man before he can find help against the plague! Distinction without difference is one of my opponent's strong points.

"But the logic of the passage is urged, and by this is meant chiefly the connexion with the immediately preceding words, *εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἴσθ' ἀπ' οὐ*. Dr Kennedy has not observed that my interpretation of these words is different from his own. To complete their sense he seems to supply *φήμην ἀκούσας*. I supply *ἀλκὴν* from the main sentence. He takes *οὐ* as an indefinite adverb of manner, I, as an indefinite adverb of place."

"I will not follow Dr Kennedy's example in attempting to state my adversary's case for him. No one can state his case more effectively or pointedly than he has done. But I will now try to explain my own view of the passage, and then to defend my view.

"I think that in lines 42, 3, the priest after lauding Oedipus' former wisdom, is intended by the poet to suggest the two courses which Oedipus by his own unaided counsel actually took, viz. to send to Delphi, and to seek aid from Teiresias. In both cases no doubt the aid sought is in the form of advice, or rather direction, but in neither is any 'conference of counsels' in question.

"Further, I think that *οὐ* in this and other hypothetical sentences has the locative meaning: i.e. that *εἴτ' οὐ* signifies not 'if, as is possible' (which involves an awkward condensation), but 'if anywhere' (Phil. 44), or with a slight transference 'if on any occasion' (Aj. 521), or as, I think, here, 'if in any quarter.'

"And I would paraphrase the two lines thus: 'to find some help for us, whether help from any god, or help from a man, if you know of help in any quarter from a man.' Compare the similarly alternative appeal to Teiresias in 310, 311, *μήτ' ἀπ' οἰώνων φάτιν μήτ' εἴ τι ν' ἄλλην μαντικῆς ἔχεις ὁδόν*. (Most of this is already given in my notes, but seems to have been *φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσιν*.) Then I connect the following line, not immediately with the little clause *εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἴσθ' ἀπ' οὐ*, but, as more frequently happens, with the main tenour of what precedes. 'We beseech thee to find some help for us, for I see' (the priest is the coryphæus of the suppliants and passes easily to the singular verb) 'that experienced men are most successful in their plans.'"

Here two or three errors of the Professor must be cleared away before I deal with the main topic.

I deny that I have anywhere in my article attempted to state my adversary's case for him. I first gave a fair though free translation of the previous context which I wound up by placing in parallel columns the Professor's own version of the disputed words and my own; adding his note. Was this to state his case for him? Afterwards, wishing to put the contrast more shortly and sharply, I say that his rendering gives this context, &c., where again I conclude with his own words. Was this to state his case for him? Not at all: it was stating *my own* summary of the context, followed by *his* summary of the disputed place. Am I not entitled in argument to do this? Surely I am: and neither my longer nor my shorter exhibition of the context is really impugned by him, though he says some odd things and makes some strange blunders. To these I come.

He says: "Dr Kennedy has not observed that my interpretation of these words (εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἴσθα πού) is different from his own." I had not observed it certainly; for in the translation of the words there is no *real* difference between us, and what is said about Apollo and Teiresias had not then seemed to me to call for observation at that point.

He goes on to say of me: "To complete their sense he seems to supply φήμην ἀκούσας, I supply ἀλκὴν from the main sentence."

I will resort to no ἀνταπόδοσις here. I will not suppose that Prof. Campbell would himself commit the enormous blunder he ascribes to me, of supposing that φήμη (a *divine* voice or oracle) can be heard from an ἀνὴρ. I merely ask, when he read my paraphrase "find some *help* for us, whether suggested to you *by the voice of a god* or, it may be, *by a man*," what authorization he found in it for the idea that I supply to ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς the words φήμην ἀκούσας, or that I have any other view than his own, viz. that the object of οἴσθα is ἀλκὴν. As he takes it, so do I, εἴτε οἴσθα ἀλκὴν ἀπ' ἀνδρός.

But then the πού. When I read the grave discussion about this little particle—whether it should be rendered 'as is possible' (I wrote 'it may be') which, says my critic, 'involves an

awkward condensation,' (whatever that may mean), 'or if anywhere, or with a slight transference, if on any occasion,' or, as he thinks here, 'if in any quarter'—my thoughts involuntarily recurred to the proverb 'tempestat in matula,' and I felt sorely tempted to say, as the showman did when the small boy asked which was Bonaparte and which the Duke of Wellington, 'which you pleases, my pretty little dear.' Can Prof. Campbell doubt that the modal use of *σου* is a slight outgrowth of the local, and that the one is so little discernible often from the other that the rendering is a mere matter of feeling? 'If you happen to know,' or 'if you know anywhere,' sound to me all but identical, and had Prof. Campbell been at my elbow when I wrote, I would have translated *σου* at his discretion, for it makes no sort of difference in the discussion.

As Prof. Campbell has called my more particular attention to what I had read—his note on v. 43—and now adds that the priest 'is intended by the poet to suggest the two courses which Oedipus by his own unaided counsel actually took, viz. to send to Delphi and to seek aid from Teiresias,' I protest with full conviction against any such opinion. *Θεῶν τις*, from the priest of Zeus, suggests no definite *god*; the oracle is afterwards called *Διὸς ἀδυσπένης φάτις*, and that Teiresias is the *man* suggested here by the priest of Zeus is a baseless supposition. Teiresias, even afterwards, is not brought forward as one from whom help for the removal of the plague can be got, but he is named much later by the chorus of aged Thebans as one who best knew the mind of Apollo and who could explain the oracle. And Oedipus says he has already sent for him at the suggestion (not of the priest of Zeus, but) of Creon. It is, therefore, with surprise that I find Prof. Campbell going on to say that the priest suggests the two courses which Oedipus *by his own unaided counsel* actually took, viz. to send to Delphi and to seek aid from Teiresias. Oedipus *had already* sent to Delphi when the priest spoke, and, as a suggestion therefore, the speech had no effect. But, as to Teiresias, Prof. Campbell is flatly contradicted by Oedipus himself in the words *ἔπεμψα γὰρ Κρέοντος εἰπόντος διπλοῦς πομπούς*, v. 288. He did not send for Teiresias by *his own unaided counsel*, but in deference to

the counsel of Creon. And as, when *the priest* spoke of a *θεοῦ φήμη*, Oedipus was able to say that he had sought one by the embassy of Creon, so, when *the Chorus* suggests Teiresias to explain the oracle, he says that by Creon's advice he had sent for the old seer. This constant action of Creon it is which causes Oedipus, when charged with the crime of which he was unconscious, to impute this to the subornation of Teiresias by his kinsman. I repeat then, that no particular god and no particular man are suggested by the priest; but that Sophocles introduces the digressive words *εἴτε, κ.τ.λ.* with the purpose set forth in my *Vindiciae* from the words "My view gives"...to "in the plot of this drama." All there said I fully adhere to.¹

[I am rejoiced to learn from a note at the close of Prof. Campbell's article, that the interpretation I advocate of Oed. T. 44—5, was suggested by Dr Young about the year 1795, and adopted in Dalzell's *Collectanea Majora* by Professors Dalzell and Dunbar. Thus we have the independent authority of Dr Young (followed by two other eminent names) coming to the support of my independent view, and (partially) to that of Mr Shilleto. I have no sympathy with the saying, 'Pereant qui ante nos nostra dixerunt.' Truth is of more importance than any man's credit, and whatever of merit belongs to the discovery is awarded by just consent to the first discoverer. Therefore let Dr Young, by all means, have the merit. It is curious that I probably read the Oed. T. for the first time, when quite a child at Birmingham School, where I lived, in that very book, Dalzell's *Collectanea Majora*. At that early age I took no note of conflicting interpretations, and certain it is that, if ever I was taught to construe the place as I now do, the fact was afterwards obliterated from my mind; and for many years I knew only Brunck's rendering, until, having felt its inadequacy, I acquired the intuition of another and better one.]

¹ Look at *συμφορά*. Act. 'bringing together' (conference). Pass. 'concurrence' (of things), hence 'occurrence,' generally (by superstitious euphemism) unhappy, sometimes happy, sometimes indifferent. *Συμφοραὶ πραγμάτων*, 'concurrences of facts,' evidently = 'actual events' or 'results': but *συμφοραὶ βουλευμάτων* 'concurrences of counsels' evidently *not* = 'results of counsels.' Therefore the phrase of Thuc. does not bear out the sense usually imputed to the phrase of Soph.

II. I have next to recur to Oed. Col. 308—9.

Here I had imputed to Prof. Campbell that he adopted, without acknowledgment, the principle of interpretation by which I was enabled to set aside the old and immoral mode of rendering these lines. He says in his reply that his view was taken before he saw my notes. This had not occurred to me as possible, because, while I saw that he was acquainted with them, I had always supposed their date (1854) to be anterior to his academic life. After reading his statement, it only remains for me to withdraw, and to regret, an imputation made under a wrong impression.

[In passing let me say that the Scholium cited by Prof. Campbell φίλος—χρήσιμος is new to me. Certainly, I did not take my idea of this passage from it. No doubt I had consulted the usual modern editors, Hermann, Wunder, Erfurdt, Schneidewin, Linwood, &c., and I infer that in these I found the 'selfish' principle adopted in the interpretation, from which my feelings revolted. In Dindorf's Oxford Edition of 1860, I find an emendation rashly accepted—τίς γάρ ἐσθ' ὃς οὐχ αὐτῷ φίλος; as if this much improved the matter, at least as regards the character of Oedipus. Hence I naturally supposed that I was the first annotator to discover the right principle in taking φίλος in the sense of 'beneficial.']

The Professor's defence of the turn given in his interpretation runs thus:

"It is evident to me that this interpreter (the Scholiast) rightly connected the γνώμη with the *main current* of the preceding sentence, namely, with the assertion, couched in the form of a hope, that the princely condescension of Theseus, in visiting the poor blind man, would be fraught with blessing to the city, whose interests were inseparable from Theseus' own. It appears to me to involve a radical misconception, as well as a breach of the law of parsimony, where a motive can be supplied from the general feeling of the play, from the immediate situation, and from the drift of the preceding words, to intercalate a strain of reflection, in itself, no doubt, 'signally beautiful' (so beautiful, as to be hardly præ-Platonic), but having no relevancy either to the immediate situation or to the whole of the action. Oedipus is not there to be a teacher of absolute morality, or to

enforce the doctrine of the Gorgias before the time. But he is there to find peace and rest and to bless Athens. That in blessing Athens he will bless Theseus, is a proposition, which, while it is repeatedly assumed by Oedipus in the course of the tragedy (I might have added to my citations ll. 1508, 9, and 1518, 9), I conceive to have been more self-evident to an Athenian audience than to the modern reader. Indeed the feeling which by an inseparable association was called up by the expression $\tau\eta\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\iota$ (cp. Plato, Rep. II. 380 B) was such as to render any direct mention of the individual superfluous. I am far from denying, however, that some mental expansion of the preceding words is necessary in order to account for $\gamma\acute{\alpha\rho}$. According to my view the expression is considerably condensed. Oedipus has no doubt that the coming of Theseus will be a blessing to Athens. His chief anxiety is that (according to the assurance of the chorus) Theseus may come. But in speaking to those who could not have understood his real thought, he expresses his anxiety and his confidence in a single prayer, "Let him come and bless me and his own city." From this it is not difficult to elicit the *hypothetical* sentence, "If he comes, he will be a blessing to his own city." But this is not all. The missing $\alpha\upsilon\tau\phi\grave{\omega}$ is not utterly suppressed. It is implied in $\epsilon\upsilon\tau\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$, which strikes the *key-note*. For it would be pleonastic to say $\epsilon\upsilon\tau\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\phi\grave{\omega}$. And I may own that Dr Kennedy's strictures have here suggested what I believe to be the true motive for the substitution of the adjective for the adverb in this passage."

Prof. Campbell allows my version to be 'signally beautiful.' I contend that it is also signally true.

His reasoning on the other side fails to shake my opinion in the least degree. All that now appears in my reprinted article I maintain, and desire to repeat it in this place. He so constantly sets up vague transcendental ideas, such as 'law of parsimony' and the like, and dogmatizes so confidently about what Athenians and poets would or would not do at certain eras and before certain others, that, in such discursions, I can often oppose to him only silent incredulity. Thus I respectfully decline to accept from him as a dogmatic truth that Sophocles could not write before Plato what I put in the mouth of Oedipus here. I do not include in this deprecation aesthetical remarks on the characters, or structure, nexus, &c., of each play. This field of argument is a very important one, and open to both of

us. And when he is satisfied with referring *αὐτῷ* to *τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει*, I add to what I have before said this further remark, that to make the benefit to Athens so special a benefit to Theseus personally, in a place where Theseus is not even present, seems to me out of keeping, and foreign to the very gist and conception of the piece. The chief design and leading feature of this play is to delight and flatter the Athenian people, the poet's audience, by the myth, that the residence and sepulture of Oedipus at Colonus is destined to be a blessing to Athens, a security to it against foreign foes, especially against the hated Thebans; a pledge of victory for all time (see the speech of Oedipus at v. 1518, &c.). I cannot believe that Sophocles would weaken the impressive effect of this perpetual promise given to the state itself by making it so emphatically personal, as this closing *αὐτῷ* would obviously make it, to the ancient and long deceased Athenian king. Even where the benefit is brought forward in words addressed to Theseus himself, the city is by an emphatic position made the chief recipient (*σὲ πόλιν τε τήνδε* 1509, *ἃ σοι γήρως ἄλυπα τῇδε κείσεται πόλει* 1519): and again in *χοῦτως ἀδῆον τήνδ' ἐνοικήσεις πόλιν σπαρτῶν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν*. 1533—4, the context shews that all the stress is thrown, not on *ἐνοικήσεις* (which refers as much to the successors of Theseus as to himself) but on *τήνδε πόλιν*. But, if this passage is taken as Prof. Campbell wishes, all the stress is thrown on Theseus himself. He, because he is a good man, is to receive this benefit, rather than the city: the city is merged in the individual. I say, on the other hand, that to glide over the personal interest of Theseus by a moral maxim, conveying at the same time a graceful compliment, is what best suits the purpose of the poet in this play, and at this point. Thus it becomes 'signally beautiful,' being signally in place.¹

Not less telling arguments against Prof. Campbell's view are (1) the disjunction (which could have been avoided) of *αὐτῷ* from *αὐτοῦ πόλει* by the intervening *ἐμοί τε*, and (2) the violent nature of the ellipsis after an optative. This Prof. Campbell now owns himself obliged to supply by 'the hypothetical sen-

¹ That *εὐτυχὴς αὐτῷ* could not be used, I admit; but this rather strengthens my view.

tence' which he (εἰς ὧν;) 'thinks it not difficult to elicit: If he comes, he will be a blessing to his own city.' I had also observed that another ellipsis is mentally to be supplied, namely, that to be a blessing to his own city is the same thing as being a blessing to himself. So, once again 'Eligat lector: egomet elegi.'

[Perhaps I should notice here the opinion expressed by Dr James Browning, and cited in Prof. Campbell's note, that my view of Oed. Col. 308—9 is "unnatural and uncalled for." Whether it is "uncalled for" or not, must be determined by the weight of the arguments urged for and against it in this discussion. Whether it is "unnatural," must be matter of opinion and feeling. What is "signally beautiful" need not, one might think, be deemed unnatural, when placed by a Sophocles in the mouth of such an one as Oedipus. I can only reply that I do not feel it to be this, but the very reverse. It is not given to all minds alike to discern the aesthetically true and beautiful. Nor are the special beauties of all poets equally discernible even by cultivated minds. A Sophocles in the Periclean age of Greece, a Robert Browning in the Victorian age of England, require a strong poetic vision to discover all their excellence. Many a reader of these and some other poets may be likened to the incompetent bird (described by Coleridge) that

Drops his blue-fringed lids, and holds them close,
And, hooting at the glorious sun in heaven,
Cries out, Where is it?]

III. Antigone 31, 32.

Here I need not repeat my objections to the ordinary version, which makes σοὶ κάμοι objective in dependence on κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν. Prof. Campbell sets up no defence for this, though he slightly cavils about the word *all* (the citizens) which stood in my text by mere inadvertence, and is now removed. He pins his faith on the theory of a Dativus Ethicus (or 'unemphatic' Dative) σοὶ followed instantaneously by a hyperemphatic κάμοι, which he supports by an erroneous vilification of the noblest character drawn by Sophocles, that of Antigone, and to justify that vilification adduces his own distorted exhibition of a previous verse, 10.

Let me assure Prof. Campbell that I have conversed about this supposed ethic dative with some of the best scholars here, and all with one voice reject it as untenable and, placed as it is, impossible.

I omit some passages of my own and of Prof. Campbell's Article, which are of no real moment to the question at issue. The Professor cites places in which an *objective* Dative stands at more or less distance from the verb. These have no relevancy. He also cites Oed. Col. 1518—19, already quoted by me. Here the ethic σοι, which is a real Dativus Commodi (for I agree with Prof. Campbell that such Datives have various grades of emphasis), is quite in a proper position, and affords no support to the notion of an ethic σοι in the place before us.

He also seeks to justify it by the νῶν 3, τῶν σῶν τε κἀμῶν 6, and other previous references by Antigone to Ismene and herself, which he says make σοι naturally understood, even if separated from its context. I cannot see the force of this argument.

Then he adds:

"Dr Kennedy says the presence of φασὶ forbids the very idea of any such dative. Even if this were not a mere 'canon for the nonce' (I do not see why a Greek author might not have written

ἄ σοι
γῆρως ἄλνπά φημι κείσεσθαι πόλει),

the energetic rapidity of the speech (of which more presently) would make light of such an obstacle, and φασὶ is a mere resumption from l. 27. Besides, in this respect there is no difference between φασὶν ἔχειν and ὥς φασιν, ἔχει."

Prof. Campbell's instance invented here seems to shew that he does not understand my argument. The σοι in it would naturally depend on φημί, 'I tell you,' which, no doubt, could be written with propriety. But in the Antigone there is no such dependence. As to 'the energetic rapidity' &c., it seems to me that this is one of the Professor's playful inventions for

getting rid of a troublesome objection at an easy rate. As to 'a canon for the nonce,' my objection is no canon at all, but a challenge to him to produce any instance in which such a conjunction of words occurs as οὕτω φασὶν ἔχει σοι ταῦτα, or even οὕτως, ὥς φασιν, ἔχει σοι ταῦτα.

In short my feeling as a Greek scholar, and the feeling of other Greek scholars to whom I have spoken, is that a true ethic σοι (as distinguished from its use as objective or as Dativus Commodi) will not be found in an Infinitive clause so subordinated. See El. 343, 665, 761, 924, 938, 1292. Oed. C. 62. After μάθ' οὐνεκ' ἐστὶ it does occur, Oed. T. 708, and this is the nearest approach I find to a position of this nature. But the Imperative μάθε is the justification for it there.

But even more intolerable is the addition of the highly emphatic κάμοι to an unemphatic σοι, and we may well demand of Prof. Campbell some authority for such a construction—authority which I venture to believe he will nowhere find.

I come now to a remarkable passage in Prof. Campbell's Reply, and I have read it with sincere regret.

"Dr Kennedy says that this explanation is in violation of dramatic taste and propriety. I am sorry for Antigone. She is misunderstood by her latest champion, and I fear that even he, could he understand her rightly, might prove to be a 'modern Creon.' The Antigone of Sophocles is supposed by him to come on the stage with a disposition to make 'a modest acknowledgement of error,' and to avoid anything like an assumption of superiority in addressing her sister. 'I own I thought better of my uncle than to expect this of him; I know that you esteem him highly, and I confess I once did so too.' That is the tone of the maiden, who has already spoken of Creon as an enemy, and, before she has uttered ten lines, has intimated with ill-suppressed scorn, the suspicion that her sister will be slow to apprehend the coming evil!

"It is true that she would win Ismene to share her purpose, but she would win her by sheer impetuosity or not at all. At the same time, no comparison of herself with Ismene is implied in my construction of these words. When she is carried away by her feeling into this brief outburst, she is not thinking of her sister, but of her own passionate resolve."

I am sorry too, not for Antigone, but for Prof. Campbell, who here shews himself unable to understand not only the scope of Antigone's character, but the whole context of the opening of this play. What? Antigone, he says, before she has uttered ten lines has intimated with ill-suppressed scorn(!!!), the suspicion that her sister will be slow to apprehend the coming evil! (This last note of admiration is his own, not, as it happens, inaptly introduced.) I search the previous context for this intimation, and, aided by the mention of 'ten lines,' I find that the Professor refers to the words ἔχεις τι κείσῃκουσας; ἢ σε λανθάνει | πρὸς τοὺς φίλους στείχοντα τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακά; Now we must sum up the whole opening speech of Antigone, which these words conclude.

The sisters have issued from the palace gate. Antigone says (I summarily represent her words): 'My own sister Ismene, know you yet any misery resulting from our father's woes which will not be fulfilled in our lifetime? Methought there was nought of sorrow and disgrace which you and I had not seen and suffered. Yet now—what is this fresh mischief (αἶψα), this decree which the military chief is said to have lately published? Do you know it from hearsay, or are you unaware that ills of foes are stalking towards (impending o'er) friends?'

To which Ismene replies, that she knows nothing about it; she has heard no report, good or evil.

I was sure of that, says Antigone, and I brought you forth to acquaint you with it privately.

What is it? says Ismene; evidently you have something momentous to say.

Why, our two brothers—replies Antigone, has not Creon given honourable sepulture to the one, refused it to the other? Eteocles, as report goes, he has duly buried, but the wretched corpse of Polynices they tell me the citizens have been warned by proclamation not to entomb or wail over, but to leave it unwept, unsepulchred, a prey to loathsome birds.

All my readers must surely marvel, as I do, at the strange hallucination which leads Prof. Campbell to find 'ill-suppressed scorn and suspicion' in Antigone's simple question, whether her sister had heard of Creon's proclamation. I claim for her a

full and honourable acquittal from the charge thus laid against her of rude violence and unsisterly conduct.

In a note the Professor says: 'The negatives in the first speech are enough to shew that Antigone is in a white heat from the very beginning of the play.' It does not concern me to question the positive evidence of the negatives, or the white heat of Antigone. That she was indignantly resolved to do, if need were, a great and dangerous act of duty, and that she meant to claim her sister's help as her sister's duty, is true enough, and this state of mind may be a white heat, if any one likes to call it so. Such a state is ignoble or noble according as the causes and motives which engender it are unjust or just, selfish or unselfish. A Chrysippus or a Seneca would condemn it in either case as an unphilosophic emotion; but Sophocles wrote before the Stoic era: Sophocles was a tragic poet, and his Antigone is a woman of feeling as well as principle. It is true that when Ismene has refused to help, Antigone's bitter disappointment, her strong disapproval, her own deep conviction of duty and high-strung resolution to perform it, do lead her to use towards her sister some words of keen reproach (vv. 86—7, 93—4): and here her passion, whatever it was before, rises, if Prof. Campbell likes to say so, to 'a white heat:' for it is truly said by another poet,

"To be wroth with those we love
Doth work like madness on the brain."

But nowhere else from first to last does the noble maiden condescend to violent and scolding language: (her application of a proverb in the words *σχεδόν τι μωρῷ μωρίαν ὀφλισκάνω* cannot be so styled in a Greek speaker, though it sounds rude to a modern ear).

Neither do I admit that Antigone has called Creon 'an enemy.' This Prof. Campbell gathers from v. 10.

πρὸς τοὺς φίλους στείχοντα τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακά,

on which his exegesis is

'In the vehemence of her resentment she already speaks of Creon as an enemy. *τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακά.*'

This I believe to be essentially wrong. If it be true (and this is doubtful) that her thought here is to consider Creon an *ἐχθρός*, yet that she should avowedly declare him such, is inconsistent with several things. She has just called him *τὸν στρατηγόν*, in v. 21 she calls him Creon without any epithet, in these lines she calls him 'the good Creon,' ironically of course, but with an irony which means that up to that time he had acted well and kindly. Nor is any further term of vituperation to be found through the rest of the scene or afterwards. Add to which that Antigone studiously speaks of this decree as a thing reported and not yet absolutely certain: thrice she uses the word *φασί*, *they say* (7, 27, 31), once *ὡς λέγουσι*, *as they say* (23). Is this the manner of 'white heat'? is this the style of one who would then and there, without hesitation, denounce Creon as an enemy? Not so to my mental ear. Therefore I have always hesitated to interpret *τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακά* as the Scholiast and Prof. Campbell do. Regarding the Greek construction, it is open to mean either *κακά ἃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ δρῶσιν*, or *κακά ἃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ πάσχουσιν*, and, so far as the word *κακά* alone is concerned, for once that it means ills inflicted (injuries), ten times or more it means 'ills endured.' But I allow that, with *τῶν ἐχθρῶν* for its subject, the *prima facie* view is that of the Scholiast. Yet this remains true, that 'ills of foes' is a right translation, and it may convey the sense 'ills which properly belong to foes,' deprivation of sepulture. I dare not assert that Sophocles meant to put this and no more in Antigone's heart and mouth. I am inclined to think he meant her to use an ambiguous phrase, but I feel perfectly convinced that, at the most, he did not mean to make her say more than this: 'ills such as enemies inflict.' That *τοὺς φίλους* and *τῶν ἐχθρῶν* are contrasted terms and deliberately placed in contrast is obvious; and, as Ismene did not know, and was not supposed to know, who were meant by *τοὺς φίλους*, neither could she understand who were *οἱ ἐχθροί*. Therefore I consider the exegesis of Prof. Campbell on v. 10, above cited, to be erroneous and ill-considered.

Antigone is misunderstood by him, not by me. She is as noble a character as any drawn even by Shakspeare. She is

not 'a gem of purest ray serene,' like Miranda, she is not a sweet, saintly, suffering wife, like Desdemona and Imogen, or a love-enthralled and empasioned enthusiast like Juliet, Ophelia and Viola. She is not as captivating as Rosalind, she has not the sprightly wit of Beatrice. Her nearest compeers are Isabella and Cordelia; but the situation of the first is totally different, and the second is but half an Antigone. In the Oedipus Coloneus we see her the stay and solace of a blind suffering aged father; in her own drama we have her tearing herself away from love and life to do the last duties to a brother's corpse: a self-sacrifice which none can appreciate who do not comprehend the intense religious horror with which the Greeks regarded the refusal of sepulture. And they who read the lyric lamentations which the poet assigns to her, and the beautiful farewell beginning ὦ τύμβος, ὦ νυμφεῖον...will not impute to her an untender heart, incapable of feeling and lamenting all she is about to lose. Yet is she from first to last (setting aside her stern words to Ismene, whose cowardice she finds it hard to condone) calm and dignified; and her final words are a solemn appeal to gods and men against the justice of her sentence (937—43).

Hear Prof. Campbell finally:

"It is only out of respect to Professor Kennedy that I would urge a further objection to construing the datives with ἀγαθόν. It is that such an epexegetis, which seems to me tame at best, is wholly out of keeping with the rapidity of such a speech as this. It is not the language of feeling at all. And it sadly interrupts the rhythm."

I recognize no force and no truth in the observation here. I do not allow the propriety of the term 'epexegetis.' If Sophocles meant, as I say he did, to place in the mouth of Antigone a candid acknowledgment that not only the *mild* Ismene, but her *keener-tempered* self had recognized hitherto the fitness of the epithet 'good' as applied to Creon, the datives are no mere 'afterthought' of the speaker, but spoken with full intent. 'The rapidity' is one of what I have called Prof. Campbell's playful inventions. I desiderate no other

feeling here than such as my version gives. And as to the rhythm, I find no fault, as I surely might, if a hyperemphatic *καὶ μοι* were made to follow an unemphatic *σοι*. I do not understand him now to say that there is any grammatical objection to the datives depending on *ἀγαθόν*. That point is, I trust, settled. Mr Paley, who, as editor of Aeschylus and Euripides, is as familiar with the Greek tragic drama as any English scholar, authorizes me to add his opinion, that my version is, in his judgment, unexceptionable in point of Greek. He equally thinks that an unemphatic dative such as Prof. Campbell with Schneidewin champions, is out of the question, and so say all to whom I have spoken. I have refrained from consulting Mr Jebb, excellent scholar as he is, because, as he will, I trust, have to pronounce upon this and other points hereafter as an editor of Sophocles, I have not thought it right to call him to judgment before the time. So then, of the three proposed versions of this passage, one, the oldest, which makes these datives simply objective to *κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν* is contrary to fact and involves an absurdity. The second fails, in some measure on the same grounds, but also because as grammar and as Greek, it is an unheard-of and untenable combination, and because it is an insult to the beautiful character of Antigone, and so to the taste and feeling of Sophocles. There only remains my version, against which nothing has been urged but what I aver to be merely futile in every point of view.

III. SELECT NOTES ON THE OEDIPUS REX, with special reference to the Edition of Professor Campbell.

[In these Notes the following Abbreviations are used for the names of Editors and Commentators:

C. Campbell.	R. Ritter.
E. Elmsley.	Sch. Schneidewin.
H. Van Herwerden.	Wo. Wolff.
L. Linwood.	Wu. Wunder.]

THE besetting fault of Prof. Campbell's exegesis (already noticed in the Introduction) is this: when he halts between two opinions

(a thing which may happen to any scholar), he not only cannot, in many instances, resolve to choose between the two, but often resorts to an inadmissible compromise between them, and would have us accept an impossible *tertium quid*. The mischievous consequences of this erroneous system will often appear in the following Notes (vv. 2, 27, 35—36, 86, &c.).

1. Here C. writes:

“The scene discloses the priest of Zeus...who are seated round the altar of the king’s palace...The children sit on the steps of the altar.”

But, on v. 16 (*βωμοῖσι τοῖς σοῖς*),

‘At thy altars,’ i.e. the altars of Apollo and perhaps other deities before the king’s palace: Cp. 919. “Thou seest us seated at thine altar, and our years, &c.”

What sort of commentary have we here? First *altar* (twice); then *altars* (twice), then back to *altar*; and not a word to reconcile these discrepancies. That more than one altar was before the palace is certain, for *βωμοί* cannot be a Plural-singular. I should conjecture even four, two on each side of the central palace-door, from which Oedipus issues. Round those next the door children may sit; youths round a third, priests at the fourth. It is possible that the first words of Oedipus, ὦ τέκνα, are addressed immediately to the children, or at all events that their age (with that of the ἡῤῥεοι) supplies the motive for this twice-used term of affection, from which the king, as he approaches the λογεῖον, passes to another phrase, designating the priest, ὦ γεραιέ.

2. *θοάζετε*. On this C. writes:

“The ancient grammarians give two meanings to *θοάζειν*: 1. sitting; 2. hastening.”

Then, after citing Plutarch’s authority for the former sense here, and giving reasons in support of it, he goes on to give other reasons in favour of the latter sense, and ends, *more suo*, with a compromise uniting both.

"The subtilty (!) of the expression *θοάζειν ἔδρας* in this sense is in the manner of Sophocles:—

‘Why do you press me so with your supplication?
Why sit ye here in such an earnest throng?’”

This far-fetched fancy (for sitting on altar steps is not speeding or hurrying) is at variance with the alternative question afterwards put by Oedipus in v. 10. *τίνι τρόπῳ καθέστατε, δείσαντες ἢ στερξάντες*;

Linwood takes the right and rational view: ‘*θοάζειν* h. l. simplici *sedendi* significatione adhibetur. Cf. Buttm. Lex. s. v. *θαάσσειν*.’ C. makes no reference to Buttmann.

“*Moi* is at once precatory; as in *τί μοι, μή μοι*, and the like, and also dative of remote reference, because they come as suppliants to his own altars.” C.

In *all* such instances *μοι* is ethic dative, i. e. of remote reference. The term ‘precatory’ has no distinctive fitness, for even if interrogative and imperative sentences were rightly grouped together by it, the ethic *μοι* is not confined to these. See El. 87. *ὥς μοι πολλὰς μὲν θρήνων ᾤδᾶς, πολλὰς δ’ ἀντήρεις ἧσθου στέρνων πληγὰς*.

10—13.

*τίνι τρόπῳ καθέστατε,
δείσαντες, ἢ στέρξαντες ὥς θέλοντος ἂν
ἐμοῦ προσαρκεῖν πᾶν; δυσάλητος γὰρ ἂν
εἴην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτείρων ἐδράν.*

I cite these lines with the punctuation which (as Wo.) I think the right one: and render thus: ‘In what frame are ye here? terrorstricken? or resigned, *in the assurance* that I shall wish to give you every assistance? *truly I shall*; for I were unfeeling if I seemed not to pity a supplication such as this.’ Compare *θέλοντος ἂν* here with *δράσοντος* 145.

C. has two notes, neither of which is instructive. The first I need not cite. He, with several other edd., puts the interrogation after *στέρξαντες*, and supposes the clause with *ὥς* to mean ‘since I shall wish,’ &c. Also he renders *στέρξαντες*, ‘with a feeling of desire,’ a sense which I hold to be precluded by the tense as well as by the meaning of the verb. *Στέργειν*

means 'contentus esse,' 'acquiescere,' and Oedipus asks whether their mood is one of anxious alarm, or one of acquiescent resignation founded on a conviction that he will be willing to help them. Then is understood a clause on which γὰρ depends:— 'yes, I shall be willing.'

I now cite C.'s second note, because it is, unhappily, among those which prove that he is not quite an ideal editor of Sophocles.

"μὴ οὐ. The force of the two particles here seems to be the same as with the infinitive after αἰσχροῦν, ἄλογον, and other words of disapproval, where οὐ is added, when the case, though in form hypothetical, is actually present. The double negative also points the antithesis, 'I shall be willing, for I should be hard-hearted not to pity you.' For the omission of οὐ, where the case is purely hypothetical cp. ll. 76, 7, ὅταν δ' ἴκοιτο, τηνικαῦτ' ἐγὼ κακὸς μὴ δρῶν ἂν εἶην κ.τ.λ., which in other respects is parallel to this (!). The difference between μὴ οὐ and μὴ in such expressions seems to be that μὴ is general and hypothetical, while μὴ οὐ refers to a case which is immediately present." C.

Did Prof. Campbell realize his own meaning when he wrote, 'The double negative points the antithesis'? If he did, he is more fortunate than I am; for I have striven in vain to discover what antithesis is meant, and wherein the pointing consists. When he speaks of 'the omission of οὐ,' I must observe that it would be more germane to the matter to account for its *presence*, as μὴ οὐ with participles occurs only thrice in Greek tragedy: each time in Sophocles. Perhaps it is charitable to regard ὅταν δ' ἴκοιτο as a 'lapsus plumae' for ὅταν δ' ἴκηται, but it is one of those lapses which I cannot imagine a scholar making in MS. or passing over in type. Of μὴ οὐ (which I admit to be the most difficult point in Greek grammar, and not adequately explained in any treatise I have read) the account given here is valueless. I prefer the opinion which regards μὴ οὐ as stating cause (?) from a subjective point of view. That is (in this place), Oedipus says, 'You are resigned, because you expect that I shall be willing to assist you: and you are right: for I should be devoid of all sympathy, if in your view I were one who did not pity such a supplication;' i. e. if you could justly assign as a *reason* for deeming me unsympathetic, that I did

not, &c. *Mḡ* alone with participle is of course merely = *εἰ μῆ* with verb. If, with Sch., we reject *οὐ* here, then Oedipus simply says *of himself*, 'I should be unfeeling if I did not pity,' as *κακὸς μῆ δρῶν ἂν εἴην*, 'I should be wicked, were I not to do,' &c.

19—21.

τὸ δ' ἄλλο φῦλον ἐξεστεμμένον
ἀγοραῖσι θακεῖ πρὸς τε Παλλάδος διπλοῖς
ναοῖς ἐπ' Ἰσμηνοῦ τε μαντεία σποδῶ.

I take away the comma after *θακεῖ*, because it is not needed, also because it is possible, though not essential, that *ἀγοραῖσι* should depend on *πρὸς*. C. renders τὸ δ' ἄλλο φῦλον, 'and there is another gathering.' If this is right, it must be repeated before each place of supplication. But I see no reason why the words should not be rendered 'the remainder of the suppliant body,' which is then supposed to be distributed to the several localities. C., recognizing two Markets at Thebes, nevertheless says: 'But the plural is more probably simply poetical.' 'Ἀγοραὶ for ἀγορὰ requires authority, which he will find it hard to produce.

24.

βύθων φοινίου σάλου.

"Out of the depths of the ruffian billow." C.

I do not understand 'the depths of a billow,' nor do I see why *φοίνιος*, 'bloody' (or 'blood-red') should be rendered 'ruffian.' Translate: 'from the depths of a bloody sea.' ['The ruffian billows' in Shakspeare have 'monstrous heads,' but of their 'depths' we read nothing.]

27.

ἐν δ' ὁ πύρφορος θεὸς
σκήψας ἐλαίνει...

"ἐν is adverbial; but is softened (?) by a supposed tmesis from σκήψας." C.

Here he recurs to his favourite device of eclectic interpretation; and in this place it may be exposed shortly and clearly: for either ἐν belongs to σκήψας, in which case it is a disjoined *preposition*, or it is an *adverb*, and has no more to do

with *σκήψας* than if this word were left out, as it might be. There is room for hesitation as to which is the right view, but 'half and half' it cannot be. I follow L., who says: 'Alii per tmesin explicant, *ἐνσκήψας*: rectius alii *simul* vel in *horum numero* interpretantur. *ἐν* adverbiascit et hic et infra, v. 183; Oed. Col. 55; Ant. 420, 1274; Trach. 207; Aj. 675 (ubi vid. Herm.); El. 713.'

31—34. *θεοῖσι μὲν νυν οὐκ ἰσούμενόν σ' ἐγὼ
οὐδ' οἶδε παῖδες ἐζόμεσθ' ἐφέστιοι,
ἀνδρῶν δὲ πρῶτον ἔν τε συμφοραῖς βίου
κρίνοντες, ἔν τε δαιμόνων ξυναλλαγαῖς.*

"Σε is probably governed, *πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον*, by the verbal notion in *ἐζόμεσθ' ἐφέστιοι* = *προσέγμεθα*." C.

Prof. Campbell's zeal for what he calls 'simplicity' in vv. 44—5 does not prevent him from ever and again looking out for constructions the very reverse of simple and obvious. Linwood's juster aesthesis guides him right: '*ἰσούμενον* pendet a *κρίνοντες* in v. 34.'

So Sch.: '*ἰσούμενον* hängt ab von *κρίνοντες*.'

So Wu. emphatically: 'Illud sua sponte quisque intelliget, accusativum *ἰσούμενόν σε* aptum esse e participio *κρίνοντες*.'

So Wo., R.; and, I imagine, every other scholar who has touched the place.

And yet, in the teeth of *prima facie* syntax, in the teeth of this 'consensus,' Prof. Campbell has such confidence in his single judgment, that he does not give his readers so much as the alternative, but ignores all interpretation except his own. Is he a safe guide in the study of Sophocles?

35—6. *ὅς γ' ἐξέλυσας, ἄστν Καδμείον μολών,
σκληρᾶς ἀοιδῶν δασμόν ὃν παρείχομεν.*

"ἐξέλυσας sc. *ἡμᾶς*," C. (and then): "The gen. *σκληρᾶς ἀοιδῶν* is in two connections (1) after *ἐξέλυσας* 'freed us from the inexorable songstress,' (2) with *δασμόν* 'the tribute paid to her';...*δασμόν* is a second accusative completing the notion of the action of the verb." C.

I must release the inexorable songstress herself from the bigamous condition in which she is placed by this note. 'Εξέ-

λυσας does *not* govern two accusatives: therefore ἡμᾶς is not to be supplied. Σκληρᾶς αἰδοῦ is *not* 'in two connections': but depends on δασμὸν alone, and not at all on ἐξέλυσας. Render 'you who came to Thebes, and put an end to (lit. loosed-off) the tribute of the Sphinx, which we were paying.' So Liddell and Scott under ἐκλύω, rightly.

49—50. ἀρχῆς δὲ τῆς σῆς μηδαμῶς μεμνώμεθα
στάντες τ' ἐς ὀρθὸν καὶ πεσόντες ὕστερον.

I explained this in 1854:

'Let us not remember your reign by the fact of our having been raised to a prosperous position and depressed afterwards.'

C. has the same, without citing me:

"Let not this be our memory of your reign, that we rose to prosperity and afterwards fell down."

Others, as L., assume the opt. wrongly.

62—3. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑμῶν ἄλγος εἰς ἓν ἔρχεται
μόνον καθ' αὐτόν, κοῦδέν' ἄλλον.

The reading ἐν for ἓν (E., Wu.) gives no sense. Here ἄλγος means 'the motive of grief' (τὸ ἀλγύνον) as ὀργή in v. 337 = τὸ ὀργαίνον.

Translate:

'In your cases the cause of grief applies to each individual privately, and to no one else.'

C. does not say a word on the passage, much as it needs comment.

80. εἰ γάρ, 'utinam.' C. disconnects these two words; wrongly.

86. τίς ἡμῖν ἥκει τοῦ θεοῦ φήμην φέρων;

"τοῦ θεοῦ is partly genitive with φήμην and partly ablative (!) with ἥκει φέρων." C.

Ecce iterum! τοῦ θεοῦ is a true possessive gen. dependent on φήμην. See above, vv. 2, 35—6.

87. λέγω γὰρ καὶ τὰ δύσφορ' εἰ τύχοι
κατ' ὀρθὸν ἐξελθόντα πάντ' ἂν εὐτυχεῖν.

"That even our troubles, if they go to their right issue, will all turn out well." C.

The pronoun *our* is badly introduced, for the maxim is a general one. Neither does he mark the antithesis of *δυσ*, *εὖ*, and the correspondence of *τύχοι*, *εὐτυχεῖν*. Render: 'I say that even ills, if they came to a right end, would all come to good.'

99. ποίῳ καθαρμῶ; τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς ξυμφορᾶς;

I had suggested as a possible interpretation of the second clause here, 'What is the mode of dealing with it?' (τῆς ξυμφορᾶς = τοῦ ξυμφέρεσθαι). Prof. Campbell is so good as to suppose that I confound *ξυμφέρεσθαι* with *προσφέρεσθαι*. Begging his pardon, I do nothing of the kind, as might have appeared from my citing Oed. Col. 641, τῇδε γὰρ ξυνοίσομαι.

Τοῦ ξυμφέρεσθαι would mean 'of falling in with—of complying with'—the directions of the oracle; i.e. 'what is the mode of performing the purification and atonement?' *Προσφορᾶς* could certainly not have been used, having another religious sense which would be in collision with this.

The ground of my suggestion ought to be obvious. That two questions of a totally different kind should be asked here in such a sharp manner, without any particle of distinction, is harsh in the extreme: whence I was led to conjecture that the second repeats the first in a different form. If I were also to urge that only one question receives an answer, I suppose it would be replied that τόδ' αἶμα χειμάζον πόλιν involves an answer to the second. This does not satisfy me, but it is specious: and I leave my conjecture to its chance of approval or rejection.

117. κατεῖδ', ὅτου τις ἐκμαθὼν ἐχρήσατ' ἄν;

So B. L. Schn. with most edd., rightly, I think, for the Relative ὅτου is apt here. κατεῖδεν οὐ C. κατεῖφ' ὅτω, D. H. With ἐχρήσατ' ἂν und. τῇ μαθήσει.

- 124—5. πῶς οὖν ὁ ληστής, εἴ τι μὴ ξὺν ἀργύρῳ
ἐπράσσειτ' ἐνθένδ', ἐς τόδ' ἂν τόλμης ἔβη;

‘Thuc. V. 83, comparat Dobraeus, ὑπῆρχε δέ τι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἀργούς αὐτόθεν πρᾶσσόμενον. Verte: nisi res hinc pecunia transacta esset.’ L. 1846.

‘Unless there were something attempted with bribes from Thebes.’ Cf. Thuc. 4, 121; 5, 83, ὑπῆρχε δέ τι αὐτόθεν πρᾶσσόμενον. C. 1871.

I had written in 1854, correcting Wunder, ‘The subject of ἐπράσσετο is τι: “unless some intrigue were being conducted from this city with money:” i.e. unless some bribery were going on.’

134. πρὸ τοῦ θανόντος τήνδ’ ἔθεσθ’ ἐπιστροφῇν.

So most edd. since Aldus and Turnebus, who read πρὸς for πρὸ. The MS. authority for each preposition is about equal, for the σ of πρὸς is erased in the Laurentian MS. C. reads πρὸς, and thinks it better adapted to ἐπιστροφῇν. But ἐπιστρέφεσθαι may itself take a gen., as in the place he cites, and he gives no instance of ἐπ. πρὸς. There seems to me a slight balance in favour of πρὸ, ‘ye in behalf of the dead man directed this attention (i.e. to his murder).’

148. ἐξαγγέλλεται.

Subj. middle. ‘Which he announces as coming from himself.’ C.

We have to guess that ‘subj. middle’ means a subjective use of the middle voice. Usually subj. implies subjunctive: and these little matters are worth attending to. However, I do not assent to this explanation of the voice here. In Aj. 1376 ἀγγέλλομαι means, ‘I announce myself’ (or about myself), but here I would give another account of the verb. A person (especially a great person) is said in Herodotus ἐξαγγέλλεσθαι when he sends an ἄγγελος or ἄγγελοι to bear tidings. See Her. vi. 10. Now although here Oedipus has himself spoken, yet (144) he has directed a messenger to gather the Thebans together; this is ἐξαγγέλλεσθαι, while ἐξαγγέλλειν would be said of the ἄγγελος. Thus it may be called a ‘media majestatis,’ being of course a special example of the middle of indirect agency, so frequent in Greek. L. cites other examples of middle forms used by Sophocles.

150, &c. With respect to the metres of this chorus, C. says of Strophe *α*. 'the stately dactylic measures are only once interrupted by the more meditative iambic rhythm (152—160), and by a trimeter with anacrusis, giving a sort of anapaestic turn.' Again, he speaks of 'iambic and trochaic rhythms' and of 'interchange of anapaestic with dactylic' in Strophe *β*. Again, in Strophe *γ*. of 'one dactylic or anapaestic line,' while 'the other rhythms are iambic and trochaic.' But, in regard to Strophe *β*, he also alludes to 'the union of dactyls and trochees in logaoedic lines.' Had he taken a comprehensive view of the metrical character of the whole ode, he would have given more decided prominence to this last feature, which he only mentions incidentally: he would have seen that the whole character is dactylo-trochaic or logaoedic, with frequent anacruses, giving not only to dactylic lines an anapaestic semblance, but also to trochaic an iambic air.

The same reason which exists for scanning, as C. does,

ἰήιε Δάλιε Παιάν

also exists for scanning, as he does not,

Πυθῶνος ἀγλαὰς ἔβας¹

and again,

ὦ | πόποι ἀνάριθμα γὰρ φέρω,

while the line which follows contains (whether so printed or not) two verses,

πήμ|ατα νοσεῖ δέ μοι πρόπας
στόλος | οὐδ' ἔνι φροντίδος ἔγχος.

Anacruses occur again 171—3.

κλυτῶς χθονὸς αὖξεται οὔτε τόκοισιν

¹ It is of course admitted that a trochaic verse with anacrusis of one time becomes iambic, ('Mary, I believ'd thee true,' becoming 'O Mary, I believ'd thee true'), as a dactylic verse with anacrusis of two times becomes anapaestic ('over the water to Charlie' becoming 'let us over the water to Charlie'). What I mean is that whether the scansion shall recognise anacrusis or not must depend on a general view of the metrical character of the whole. Thus in the third line of an Alcaic stanza anacrusis must be recognised on account of the dactylo-trochaic rhythm of the other lines.

ἰ|ηῖ|ων καμάτων ἀνέχουσι γυναῖκες
 ἄλ|λον δ' ἂν ἄλ|λω προσίδοις ἅπερ εὐπτερον ὄρνιν

and 175

ἀκτ|ὰν πρὸς ἐσπέρου θεοῦ.

Correspondence of v. 181 with v. 172 shews that, in the former, for *ἰκτῆρες*, should be read *ἰκετῆρες*.

In Strophe γ. the general character of the metres is trochaic with anacruses; but one or two lines present special difficulties, on which I shall not dwell here.

In v. 194 I think the reading *ἔπουρον*, rather than *ἄπουρον*, is not well chosen by C. But either must be regarded as corrupt; for *Ἀρτέμιδος* in the antistrophic line shews that a word is here wanted such as *ἐξόριον*, which is the conjecture of Heimsoeth.

153. *πάλλων*.

‘*Πάλλων* is probably neuter.’ C.

Πάλλων is certainly masculine. Of course I see that he means ‘intransitive;’ but I protest against this use of a bad and now exploded term.

171. *ἀλέξεται*. Cp. L. and C.

Ἀλέξεται non dubium quin futurum sit et hic et in hujus fabulae v. 539. ἢ τοῦργον ὡς οὐ γνωρίζοιμι σοι τόδε δόλῳ προσέρπον κοῦκ ἀλεξοίμην μαθών. Formatum ab ἀλέκω. Cf. Buttm. Lex. 21, 23. L.

Ἀλέξεται is future. Cf. v. 538, 9, οὐ γνωρίζοιμι κοῦκ ἀλεξοίμην μαθών. C.

178. *ὧν πόλις ἀνάριθμος ὄλλυται*.

Quibus sine numero cadentibus urbs perit: ὧν ἀνάριθμος regitur. Cf. Trach. 247. Aj. 603. El. 232. L.

‘In countless numbers of whom my city is perishing’.....for the gen. cf. Aj. 603, *μηνῶν ἀνήριθμος* El. 232, *ἀνάριθμος ὧδε θρήνων*. C.

186. *λάμπει*.

Audaciam hujus figurae mitigare videtur Graecorum consuetudo. Sic enim *λαμπρὰ φωνή* iis clara vox est. L.

The intentional boldness is somewhat softened by the analogous use of *λαμπρός*. C.

L. is clearly used by C. in the three last cited-passages: but 'O no, we never mention him, his name is never heard.'

206. *προσταθέντα*. I cordially commend Prof. Campbell for maintaining this word against the conjecture *προσταχθέντα*, which (metre aside) I should not with him call even 'plausible;' for I do not understand *προστάσσειν βέλεα*. Liddell and Scott (too often disposed to reject rare uses) commend *προσταχθέντα*. But as there is no question about the just use of *ἐστάθην* (v. 1463), there need be none about that of any of its compounds, though found once only. *Προσταθέντα* seems possible, but is not required.

216—233:

αἰτεῖς, ἃ δ' αἰτεῖς, τᾶμ' ἐὰν θέλῃς ἔπη
κλύων δέχεσθαι τῇ νόσῳ θ' ὑπηρετεῖν,
ἀλλήν λάβοις ἂν κἀνακούφισιν κακῶν·
ἀγὼ ξένος μὲν τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐξερῶ,
ξένος δὲ τοῦ πραχθέντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν
ἵχνηνον αὐτός, μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον.
νῦν δ', ὕστερος γὰρ ἀστὸς εἰς ἀστοὺς τελῶ,
ὑμῖν προφωνῶ πᾶσι Καδμείοις τάδε·
"Οστις ποθ' ὑμῶν Λαῖον τὸν Λαβδάκου
κάτοιδεν ἀνδρὸς ἐκ τίνος διώλετο,
τοῦτον κελεύω πάντα σημαίνειν ἐμοί·
κεῖ μὲν φοβεῖται, τοῦπικλήμ' ὑπεξελὼν
αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ· πείσεται γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν
ἀστεργές οὐδέν, γῆς δ' ἄπεισιν ἀβλαβής·
εἰ δ' αὖ τις ἄλλον οἶδεν ἐξ ἄλλης χθονὸς
τὸν αὐτόχειρα, μὴ σιωπάτω· τὸ γὰρ
κέρδος τελῶ γῶ, χῆ χάρις προσκείσεται.
εἰ δ' αὖ σιωπήσεσθε κ.τ.λ.

I here add C.'s notes, though they contain no rational exegesis of this passage. After which, without stopping to 'break butterflies on the wheel,' I shall proceed to my own interpretation.

219. ἀγώ] ἃ, sc. ἔπη. 'A stranger to the report as I am to the deed.' The stress is on the former clause, the latter being taken for

granted in Oedipus' unconsciousness. The reason given is such as to place this unconsciousness in the fullest light. 'I *could not* carry the inquiry far, not having any hint to guide me:' i.e. it was not to be expected that I could go far in the search, since I knew nothing of what was relative to the matter. For μακράν, cp. Tr. 317, οὐδ' ἀνιστόρουν μακράν. For μὴ οὐ, with the participle, combining supposition and fact, cp. Hdt. 6. 106, μὴ οὐ πληρέος ἔοντος τοῦ κύκλου. 'If the disc was not full, which it was not.' So here, 'Unless I had some clue, and I had none.' αὐτό has the authority of L., and αὐτός, which appears in most other MSS., would have the effect of weakening the emphasis, which should rest on ἔχνεον. This reading therefore, although ingenious (cp. O. C. 1155), is to be rejected. The whole clause is an explanation of ξένος. 'If I had inquired, I could not have carried the inquiry far without more evidence.' C.

227—29. "These lines have been variously interpreted. Their meaning becomes clearer when it is observed that the *suppressed alternative* suggested by μέν is, 'If he has no fear, then let him remain concealed if he can.' (For μέν, cf. Tr. 457, κεί μὲν δέδοικας.) The general meaning then is, 'If the oracle has struck fear into the murderer's breast (εἴ τι μὲν δὴ δειμάτων ἔχει μέρος, l. 294), then let him remove the pollution, for to calm his fear, I tell him that he shall suffer no further harm.' αὐτός, which has the chief emphasis, is anticipated as the subject of φοβεῖται. The verb is to be sought from the previous sentence, but is something more general than σημαίνεω. 'Let him obey me,' 'Let him act.' ὑπεξελὼν can only mean 'withdrawing,' 'Let him act by taking away the guilt on his own head.' αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ depends partly on the verbal notion continued from σημαίνειν, partly on that implied in ἐπίκλημα, 'Let him remove the accusation which he will thus fix upon himself.' The sudden disappearance of a citizen would be a sufficient declaration of his guilt." C.

In approaching my present interpretation of this passage, I have to account for the fact, that, in respect of the difficult lines 219—221, it differs materially from that which appears in my notes of 1854. The view I then took did not fully satisfy me, for I felt there was a certain harshness in ascribing such preeminent importance to the adverb μακράν. But I was full of the desire to make Oedipus say that he, had he been a Theban, would have carried on the search, and with success; and my explanation was the only one which could exhibit such a meaning. Fuller consideration and deeper study of the mind of Sophocles in his portraiture of his hero's character have led me to abandon that desire, and with it my erroneous explanation of the train of thought in this place. I had seen

strongly enough the less favourable sides in the many-sided character of Oedipus, his self-confidence in action and debate, his irritability, his violent temper, his proud instinct; and I saw how these were intended and adapted to heighten the dramatic horror of the *peripeteia*. I also saw strongly enough many of the bright sides: his royal virtues as the father of his people, his zeal and honesty in the pursuit of truth, his tender affection for his daughters; and I saw how these traits were intended and adapted to heighten the pathos of the catastrophe, and to rivet the sympathy of the audience. But one bright feature I had not seen then, as I see it now in later age, with sufficient insight: and that is the delicate skill with which this admirable poet, the Greek Shakspeare, meant and contrived to exhibit Oedipus as a man of real *ἐμπειρία*, a truly sage prince

ὃς τὰ κλείν' αἰνίγματ' ἤδη, καὶ κράτιστος ἦν ἀνὴρ
ὥς τις οὐ ζήλω πολιτῶν καὶ τύχαις ἐπιβλέπων,

one who, when not provoked to sudden wrath, could be deliberative, consultative, modest, moderate, and prudent. Such he shewed himself in consulting the oracle, about which we must needs suppose that he counselled with his *θεωρὸς* Cleon: such in taking the priest's hint and following Cleon's suggestion to send for Tiresias: such, above all, he shews himself in this place—in this proclamation to the people of Thebes—his royal speech, which he had well pondered and prepared in the closet before he comes forth to deliver it in front of the palace. What then does he say here? This in sum (taking the words in the received order, which, agreeing herein with C., I am not disposed to alter):

“Citizens, I hear what you pray for, and, if you will help me and help yourselves, as I shall suggest, perhaps you will achieve your wish. When the murder of Laius happened, I was a foreigner (had I not been, I should not have traced it far, having no clue to guide me): now I am a citizen, and make this proclamation to all other citizens. Let any one who can give information come in and give it. Even the murderer himself, if he confess, shall not die, but quit the country: any man, who knows the murderer but cannot enable us to seize him, shall be rewarded

for his tidings. But whosoever knows and withholds the truth, murderer or other, him I place under solemn excommunication. Such is the help I now give. (216—243.) Furthermore: the murderer himself, or murderers, I lay under a curse: myself I lay under a curse, if I am knowingly concealing him. (244—254.) It was the will of heaven that you should not be able at the time to pursue the search. I am now settled on the throne; it becomes my plain duty to pursue it to the end, and I will. May heaven afflict such as do not help me, but bless all good patriotic Thebans." (255—275.)

I shall now clear the way for my explanation by a few remarks.

(1) In vv. 216—218 Soph., wishing to use a more modest form of promise than the Fut., adopts the unusual and bold construction *ἐὰν θέλῃς—λάβοις ἂν* (for *λήψει*).

(2) *ξένος* does not merely mean 'ignorant of.' This lies in it, but contained in the meaning 'foreigner,' which is clearly proved by the words *ὑστερος γὰρ ἀστὸς εἰς ἀστοὺς τελῶ*.

(3) *λόγου τοῦδε* means not the oracle, but the tale of the death of Laius, as talked of in Thebes. See vv. 118—131.

(4) I hold *αὐτὸς* to be the true reading in v. 221, not *αὐτό*. There is no marked emphasis on *ἵχνεον*, which is less emphatic than *μακράν*. The reading *αὐτὸς* has good MS. authority; and it stands in Flor. Γ., though not so noted by C.

(5) *οὐ γὰρ ἂν*. I aver that these particles with a Past Indic. imply of necessity a suppressed protasis, containing the negation of something preceding; and this something here is, *ξένος* (*ὦν*) *ἐξερῶ*. Therefore the protasis understood is *εἰ μὴ ξένος ᾔν*. This I hold to be absolutely certain, and I therefore say that any attempt to explain the passage without so supposing merely 'darkens counsel by words without knowledge.' Van Herwerden sees the same thing, though it does not lead him on to just conclusions. He says (opposing Schneidewin) 'At, ne recepta quidem hac correctione, quem ille voluit sensus nascetur, primo quod ita ad *ἐξερῶ* poeta addidisset *ὕμιν*,

secundo quod formula οὐ γὰρ ἂν necessario spectat ea verba in quibus est gravissimum sententiae pondus, itaque referendum est ad illa ξένος μὲν τοῦ λόγου,—ξένος δὲ τοῦ πραχθέντος, quæ mox stabiliuntur verbis ὕστερος—τελῶ, non ad ἐξερῶ, &c.

In a footnote he adds, "Ellipsis, huic formulae propria, saepius a scribis expleta est. Ita, v. c. Herod. iv. 144. Ἐφη Καλχηδονίους τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον τυγχάνειν ἐόντας τυφλοὺς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦ καλλίονος παρέοντος κτίζειν χώρου, τὸν αἰσχίονα ἐλέσθαι, [εἰ μὴ ἦσαν τυφλοί]. ultima quatuor verba insiticia esse locum inspicientibus apparebit." Whether he is right in rejecting the four words or not, the passage itself illustrates my proposition, which may indeed be confirmed by many other instances: one being vv. 82, 83 above,

ἀλλ' εἰκάσαι μὲν, ἡδύς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν κάρα
πολυστεφῆς ᾧδ' εἶρπε παγκάρπου δάφνης,

where οὐ γὰρ ἂν implies the protasis εἰ μὴ ἡδύς ἔβη, as Schn. rightly says, while C. gives his reader no instruction on the matter. See also 318; Oed. C. 98—146; Phil. 947. C.'s note on the present passage omits even to mention this all-important γάρ: which is scarcely wonderful, when an attempted explanation appears, virtually giving to γάρ the sense of 'wherefore,' or 'and accordingly.'

(6) μὴ οὐ. The conjoint use of these particles is a question which, fully discussed, would fill a small volume, and it is one respecting which such scholars as Buttman and Reisig have erred greatly, and even Hermann partially, though he (de Ellipsis. et Pleon. and ad Viger.) ought to be consulted. I shall only speak here of their use with a participle, twice in Herodotus, thrice in Sophocles. In all these places we find strong subjectivity (in Herod. oratio obliqua): and in four (for Oed. Col. 359, 60 needs separate discussion) supposed causality. The cause may be, and is in each case, a real one, but the reality is not (as C. seems to say) the reason why μὴ οὐ is used; *the subjective assumption* of reality is the reason. See v. 13.

In the lines ἀγὼ...τάδε, there lies a very close condensation of thought, which needs to be explained in English by a

paraphrase bringing out the suppressed links, and exhibiting in full the logical sequence. Such a paraphrase I now give:

"Words which will be uttered by me who was a foreigner at the time of this réport, and a foreigner at the time of the deed: nay (γάρ, i. e. *not that I lay stress on that*, for) *had I been no foreigner*, I myself should not have carried the search far, seeing I had no clue to guide me; but now, having since then been placed on the roll of citizens (*I do the only thing I could have done before*), I address to all you Cadmeans the following proclamation."

Of the lines *κεῖ μὲν φοβεῖται...προσκέισεται*, I repeat the explanation which I gave in 1854. This (which mainly consists in pointing out that the predicate suppressed in the first sentence is the *μὴ σιωπάτω* shewn in the next) when once mentioned, would be clear and certain to any scholar of really logical mind, even without the confirmation it receives from the plural *σιωπήσεσθε*, coming immediately after¹. It is however neither adopted nor even cited by C.

"Even if, in the first place, he (*the murderer*) is in terror, having *hitherto* suppressed (*ὑπεξελών*) the charge against himself, *let him now not keep silence*, for he shall suffer nothing intolerable, but shall depart from the land unscathed. Or if, in the second place, any man knows another of another land to be the murderer, let him not keep silence (*because he cannot produce him*); for I will pay the reward, and the obligation shall be credited to him besides. But if, on the contrary, ye shall keep silence," &c., &c.

The adjective *ἀστεργής*, which appears only here and in Aj. 777, I believe to mean, 'that in which no one can acquiesce' (*στέργειν*) as tolerable or hopeful (see *στέρξαντες*, v. 11). Whether *ἀβλαβής* or *ἀσφαλής* be the true reading in v. 229 is a question for editors: either word gives a good sense.

261—2. *κοινῶν τε παίδων κοῖν' ἄν, εἰ κείνῳ γένος
μὴ ὀδυστύχησεν, ἦν ἂν ἐκπεφυκότα.*

"The periphrasis of the genitive with the neuter adjective gives increased emphasis to both words." C.

¹ On this point I am glad to find myself supported by Mr Jebb's opinion.

This is one of those dicta, abounding in C.'s notes,

ἀέρια καὶ σκοτεινὰ καὶ κυανανγέα,

which are full of sound but signify nothing. Sophocles wants to say, 'we should have had common children born to us.' What emphasis is gained by saying, 'communities of common children,' and how does each adjective gain emphasis thereby? Impossible to see. And what do we want with emphasis at all? I suggested the true construction in 1854, and here repeat it: namely, that *κοινὰ* agrees with *γένη* drawn from the following *γένος*: 'communium liberorum communes partus nobis editi fuissent:' i. e. there would have been children born to us from a common mother, and so brethren to one another (*κοινοί*). See Ant. 1. ὦ κοινὸν ἀνταδελφὸν Ἰσμήνης κάρα.

278. *τὸ δὲ ζήτημα τοῦ πέμψαντος ἦν*
Φοίβου τόδ' εἰπεῖν ὅστις εἴργασταί ποτε.

'τὸ δὲ ζήτημα is at once the nominative to ἦν and accusative with what follows.' C.

Ecce iterum! Really he must choose which it shall be (and this he may fairly doubt), for it cannot be two cases 'rolled into one.' Admitting that either *ζήτημα* or *εἰπεῖν* might be made the subject of ἦν, I rather prefer the former, as I did in 1854. "The question was one for Phoebus who sent it to tell us, who is the perpetrator." Whether *τόδε* belongs to *τὸ ζήτημα*, or depends on *εἰπεῖν*, may be doubted.

282—3. *τὰ δεύτερ' ἐκ τῶνδ' ἂν λέγοιμ' ἃ μοι δοκεῖ.—*
εἰ καὶ τρίτ' ἐστί, μὴ παρῆς τὸ μὴ οὐ φράσαι.

'I would mention another thing that occurs to me after that.' 'Even if what you have to say is a third thing, do not omit to speak of it.' C.

This sounds like absurdity. What is said second, cannot be said third. There is no sense unless *δύττερα* means second in value, and *τρίτα* third in value: and such is their meaning. My note of 1854 gives, 'I should like to mention what seems to me the second best alternative after this.—Even if it is third best, omit not to state it.'

289. πάλαι δὲ μὴ παρὼν θαυμάζεται.

Μὴ παρὼν = εἰ μὴ πάρεστι, which is the ordinary construction with verbs expressing wonder. K. 1854. Μὴ παρὼν = εἰ μὴ πάρεστι = διὰ τὸ μὴ παρεῖναι αὐτόν. C. 1871.

C. renders, 'I have long been wondering he should not be here.' For *should not be*, I would write '*is not*.' And was it judicious to add the words διὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ., leading young readers to suppose that such Greek could have been used?

294. δειμάτων.

This reading (for δείματός γ') I suggested in 1854 as pretty certain. H. (1867), R. (1870), and C. (1871) adopt it, attributing it to 'Hartung.' I have vainly tried to ascertain the date of Hartung and his edition, if edition it be. C. best knows whether he himself owes it to me or really took it from Hartung. In any case he knew that I had so conjectured.

296. ὃ μὴ 'στι δρῶντι τάρβος οὐδ' ἔπος φοβεῖ.

'Who fearless doth a deed, a word affrights not.'

It is a strange aesthesis which leads C. to narrow this general truth to the particular case by rendering: 'Words have no terror for him who *was* not afraid to do the deed.'

297. I have little difficulty in preferring οὐξελέγχων here to οὐξελέγχων, which C. adopts.

305. Φοῖβος γάρ, εἰ καὶ μὴ κλύεις τῶν ἀγγέλων.

I shall here set down, as contrasting two styles of exegesis, two notes, one of which is at least meant to be clear, decisive, instructive, and consistent, while the other appears to be the reverse of all this without being absolutely wrong, for it really adopts my explanation.

'Schneidewin calls εἰ καὶ μὴ 'sinnwidrig,' and reads εἰ μὴ καί. Dindorf and Wunder εἰ τι μὴ. It would seem as if these critics supposed εἰ καὶ must be rendered *although*. But this is not the case; and the position of

'For Phoebus,—a thing I have to tell you if you have not heard it . . . καὶ merely gives a slight emphasis to the following words, especially to τῶν ἀγγέλων, 'Indeed the messengers may have told you this.' Etsi forte non audivis-

the words here may well be considered a Sophoclean hyperbaton for *εἰ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων μὴ κλύεις*, i. e. *on the supposition that even from the messengers you have not already heard it*. See above 283, *εἰ καὶ τρίτ' ἐστί.* K. 1854.

ti (Ellendt). Cp. Aj. 1127 *δεινόν γ' εἶπας· εἰ καὶ ζῆς θανόν*. Nothing is gained by transposing *εἰ μὴ καί*; still less by reading *εἴ τι μὴ*. The previous *εἰ καὶ μὴ* (302) is as likely to have influenced the poet as the scribe.' C. 1871.

Influenced the poet to do what? To use *εἰ καὶ μὴ* three lines later in a sense quite different from the former? Ellendt's *etsi* is cited without a word of disapprobation, though contrary to C.'s exegesis. What can students gain from such confused and confusing notes as these?

302—3. *ῥῦσαι σεαυτὸν καὶ πόλιν, ῥῦσαι δ' ἔμε,
ῥῦσαι δὲ πᾶν μίasma τοῦ τεθνήκοτος.*

On the second line here C. writes:

'The evil from which deliverance is sought is made the object of the verb of deliverance.'

A grievous error. '*Ῥῦσαι*, 'rescue,' appears thrice: whatever kind of object it has in the two former, it must have in the last clause. The kind of object in clauses 1 and 2 is not 'pollution,' but 'that which takes pollution from the dead man,' *thyself, the city, me*: this absolutely determines the sense of *μίasma* here to be *τὸ μεμιασμένον*. 'Rescue everything which has contracted pollution from the dead man.' This I had explained in my notes of 1854; but 'none are so deaf as they that will not hear.' Cp. the uses of *ἄλγος* 62, and *ὀργή* 337.

316—19. *φεῦ φεῦ, φρονεῖν ὥς δεινόν, ἔνθα μὴ τέλη
λύη φρονούντι· ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς ἐγὼ
εἰδὼς διώλεσ'· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δεῦρ' ἰκόμην.*

'Alas, alas! how sad to be wise where wisdom profits not: *alas, I say*, for, though I knew this well, I lost it from recollection; otherwise I had not come hither.'

It is hardly worth while to cite C.'s version, which is vague and illogical in part, giving no real account of the first *γάρ*. This, as Schn. justly says, explains *φεῦ φεῦ*.

319. I should punctuate this line

τί δ' ἐστὶν ὥς ἄθυμος εἰσελήλυθας;

'What is the matter, that you are come to us in such dejection?' not as C. does, τί δ' ἐστίν; rendering 'what ails thee? what gloom thou bringest with thee!'

325. ὥς οὖν μηδ' ἐγὼ ταῦτόν πάθω.

'Wu. and Sch. agree in understanding σιγήσομαι or the like. But the former suggests a break after πάθω, and the latter prints one, wishing to carry on the sense to the next speech of Tiresias. This I think unnecessary, the words τήνδ' ἀποστερῶ φάτιν being mentally supplied from the previous speech of Oedipus.' K. 1854.

'It is needless to suppose an aposiopesis. The suppressed clause is to be sought from what precedes: viz. ταῦτ' εἶπον, or τήνδ' ἀποστερῶ φάτιν.' C. 1871.

328. ἐγὼ δ' οὐ μήποτε
τάμ' ὥς ἂν εἴπω μὴ τὰ σ' ἐκφήνω κακά.

C. gives three interpretations, which he calls possible, of this passage. All three seem to me, for various reasons, alike impossible. I believe that my note of 1854, which I now reprint, says all that can well be said on the subject.

'These enigmatical words of one (be it remembered) who is designed to speak enigmatically, have been variously emended, punctuated, tortured, and construed by commentators. If I accepted any emendation, it would be merely εἰπὼν for εἴπω, punctuating

ἐγὼ δ' οὐ μήποτε
τάμ', ὥς ἂν εἰπὼν μὴ τὰ σ' ἐκφήνω κακά—

understanding εἴπω in the former clause, reflected from εἰπὼν. But I am more inclined to cut the knot by saying that the enigma lies in an unusually audacious collocation of the words, which the prophet utters slowly, heavily, under his breath, and unintelligibly, as appears from the succeeding question of Oedipus. The words, then, in natural order would be: ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μήποτε εἴπω τὰμὰ (ἔπη) ὥς ἂν μὴ ἐκφήνω τὰ σὰ κακά.'

337—8. ὀργὴν ἐμέμφω τὴν ἐμήν, τὴν σὴν δ' ὁμοῦ
ναίουσιν οὐ κατείδες.

It is curious to note C.'s constantly recurring failure to discern and explain the logical sequence. Here he writes:

'Oedipus is ignorant of his own passion, as he is of other things and persons that are too close to him.'

Now Oedipus had said to Tiresias, 'You would make a stone angry' (ὀργάνειας αὖν), and Tiresias answers, 'you blame my ὀργή, but do not discern that which dwells with you.' How is this explained by what C. has written? He does not attempt to tell us what the ὀργή of Tiresias means. But (as shewn in Wunder's note) it seems that in this place ὀργή is used to express 'irritating temper,' as ἄλγος was used (v. 62) to express the cause or motive of grief.

345. ὥς ὀργῆς ἔχω. 'So angry am I,' not 'in my anger,' as C.

350. ἄληθες;

'Is't possible?' C.

This is not a good expression of the phrase. It implies indignant and bitter irony, as in English 'really?' 'oh, really?' requiring the tone of the speaker to give it due emphasis. So Antig. 758. See Aristoph. Av. 175, ἀληθές, ὦ σκαιότατον εἰρηκὼς ἔπος; Ran. 840, ἀληθές, ὦ παῖ τῆς ἀρουραίας θεοῦ;

374—5. μιᾶς τρέφει πρὸς νυκτός, ὥστε μήτ' ἔμε
μήτ' ἄλλον ὅστις φῶς ὀρεῖ βλάψαι ποτ' αὖν.

'Unbroken night is your portion.' C.

He does not perceive that τρέφει points to the training of an athlete to the frame and the feats of strength. Eur. Hip. 366. ὦ πόνοι τρέφοντες βροτούς. Render: 'your nurture is of night alone, so that you can never injure me or any one that sees.'

395. C. writes: 'οὐ...προυφάνης ἔχων = προυφάνης οὐκ ἔχων.' Negatur. It is one thing to say 'you did not shew yourself to possess' (which Soph. *does* say), another to say 'you shewed yourself not to possess' (which he *does not* say).

406—7. δέῃ δ' οὐ τοιούτων ἀλλ' ὅπως τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ
μαντεῖ' ἄριστα λύσομεν τόδε σκοπεῖν.

'ὅπως is at first put in construction with δέῃ (cp. Aj. 555), but this being feeble is strengthened by the resumption in the words τόδε σκοπεῖν.' C.

I would not willingly teach the doctrine that Soph. writes in feeble language, and suddenly thinks of strengthening it at the end of his sentence; when the construction δέῃ τόδε σκοπεῖν ὅπως is good Greek. Render, 'It is not such words we need, but to consider this, how we may best resolve the oracles.'

408—9. εἰ καὶ τυραννεῖς, ἐξισωτέον τὸ γοῦν | ἴσ' ἀντιλέξαι.

'There must be an equal right of making an equal reply.' C.

Does he consider it good exegesis to ignore such a pregnant particle as γοῦν? Render, 'Lord paramount though you are, yet must you grant me equality so far at least as to make an equal reply.'

420—425. βοῆς δὲ τῆς σῆς ποῖος οὐκ ἔσται λιμήν,
ποῖος Κιθαιρῶν οὐχὶ σύμφωνος τάχα,
ὅταν καταίσθῃ τὸν ὑμέναιον, ὃν δόμοις
ἄνωρμον εἰσέπλευσας, εὐπλοίας τυχῶν;
ἄλλων δὲ πλῆθος οὐκ ἐπαισθάνει κακῶν,
ἃ σ' ἐξισώσει σοί τε καὶ τοῖς σοῖς τέκνοις.

I wrote as follows in 1854:

"If the beauty and force of this dark speech of the excited seer be not felt by the reader, no criticism can help him. The best comment is a faithful verse translation.

With the loud wailing of thy voice what shore,
What wild Cithaeron shall not echo soon,
When thou shalt know the bridal-song, which erst
Unto a home without an anchorage
Bore thee full sail, from prosperous voyage bound?
Nor see'st thou yet of other ills a host,
Which to thyself, thy babes, shall level thee."

It is unnecessary to interfere with the purposed vagueness of the two last lines, by conjecturing

ὅσ' ἐξ ἴσου σοί τ' εἶσι καὶ τοῖς σοῖς τέκνοις.

438. ἥδ' ἡμέρα φύσει σε καὶ διαφθερεῖ.

'This day shall give thee a father, and shall close over thee in darkness.' C.

A candidate thus translating would forfeit some marks from me, and, I fancy, from most examiners. Render: 'To-day shall both beget thee and destroy.'

445. ὥς παρὼν σύ γ' ἐμποδῶν
ὀχλεῖς συθείς τ' ἂν οὐκ ἂν ἀλγύναις πλέον.

The variation and disturbance of MSS. between the words παρὼν and ἐμποδῶν, the existence of σὺ in the previous line, and the great probability of a τε to correspond with that which follows, induce me to offer as a conjecture

ὥς παρὼν τέ μ' ἐμποδῶν

'since you both disturb me by your annoying presence, and by departing will cause me no further vexation.'

529. C. writes :

'κατηγορεῖτο is probably passive like ηὐδάτο.'

Might he not have omitted the adverb 'probably,' seeing that κατηγορεῖν has no middle use? or rather might he not have omitted the observation itself, even for the benefit of school-boys?

536—7. δειλίαν ἢ μωρίαν

ιδῶν τιν' ἐν ἐμοὶ ταῦτ' ἐβουλεύσω ποιεῖν ;

'ἐν ἐμοί, like ἀ δ' ἂν ἔρῃ infr. 749, breaks the rule about trisyllabic feet, which, however, may not have been absolute even in Sophocles.' C.

Some editors might have thought it due to their readers to give the rule, and to add that ἐν μοι (Reisig's conj. for ἐν ἐμοί) is adopted by Hermann, Dindorf, L. Sch. Wu. R. H. Not so Prof. Campbell, who is best content εἰς ὦν. He might also have mentioned that in v. 749 for ἀ δ' ἂν ἔρῃ Erfurdt reads ἂν δ' ἔρῃ from some MSS., and that Schaefer, Dindorf, Wu. and others

follow him. But he (C.) is silent, and does not even cite the reading in his vv. ll. Why?

538. γνωρίσοιμι, Hermann, L. Sch. C.

C.'s note is:

γνωρίσοιμι. The Attic form is preferred to the common!!!

Did he know what he was saying here? Elmsley and Dindorf read γνωριῶμι, which is *the Attic form*. He himself prints the common form, without citing the Attic, and yet annotates as above!

543. οἶσθ' ὥς ποιήσον;

'Do you know what I bid you do?' C.

In his Essay on Language, to which he refers, he says this is an instance in which the 'expression wavers between two constructions.' I have often protested against the abuse of this notion by C., who is never tired of trying to apply it. He says the phrase here obviously requires *some such* explanation, but adds none. The phrase is a conversational one, in which, by a customary corruption the cart (so to say) is put before the horse, as when we say in English 'please to tell me' for 'tell me if you please.' Literally it is 'do (ποιήσον), do you know how? (οἶσθ' ὥς),' and expresses exactly the English, 'Shall I tell you what to do?'

553—4.

τὸ δὲ

πάθημ' ὅποῖον φῆς παθεῖν δίδασκέ με.

'τὸ πάθημα,' says C. 'is governed by δίδασκε, but is also in partial construction with παθεῖν.'

This is really astounding. A Fourth-Form Master might casually take these words as an example by which to teach the construction in a Relative Clause, and might say that with the Relative word ὅποῖον is to be mentally supplied a second πάθημα (δίδασκέ με τὸ πάθημα ὅποῖον πάθημα παθεῖν φῆς): but to say that τὸ πάθημα (*having the article*) is in construction (partial or not) with παθεῖν is to sin against the elementary lessons of grammar. Suppose that instead of δίδασκέ με were written οὐκ εἴρηται, then τὸ πάθημα would be Nominative, but the Relative Clause and its analysis would remain exactly the

same. When such teaching as this appears in a Clarendon Press edition of Sophocles, surely, 'solventur risu tabulae.'

579. ἄρχεις δ' ἐκείνη ταῦτ' ἄ γῆς ἴσον νέμων;

W. L. C. refer γῆς to ἴσον, I to ἄρχεις, with Schn., as apparently more reasonable.

582. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ καὶ κακὸς φαίνει φίλος.

Here C.'s young readers might have been glad to learn from him the force of the emphatic καί.

'It is just (δὴ) in this that you *especially* shew yourself a false friend.' See note on v. 772.

596. νῦν πᾶσι χαίρω.

C. favours us with seven various ways of rendering this, himself preferring 'I rejoice before all men,' while I, as in 1854, adhere to that of which he doubts if it be Greek, and says it is 'needless tautology,' 'all bid me rejoice,' i.e. 'all say to me in passing χαίρε,' 'good day' or 'good speed' (ἀσπάζεται goes a step higher, and answers to our 'shakes hands with me:' a German might say 'kisses me'). As to the Greek in this sense, to me it has a very true flavour. 'Chacun à son goût.'

728. ποίας μερίμνης τοῦθ' ὑποστραφεῖς λέγεις;

"What thought has caused the change of feeling you thus express?' Lit. 'What thought makes you turn and say this?' The genitive is causal, but also in an imperfect construction with ὑπό in ὑποστραφεῖς. This probably suggested the reading of some MSS. ὑποστραφεῖς. The verb expresses a sharp turn and sudden change of direction or attitude. Cp. ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς." C.

The last passage ('the verb,' &c.), and this alone, is commendable here: not either the spiritless version, or the 'somnia gramma' in the well-known fashion, which follows. The prep. ὑπὸ with gen. is oftener causal than not: and *this* suggests the conjecture ὑποστραφεῖς, not the absurd notion that the gen. could be 'in imperfect construction' (!) with ὑπὸ in ὑποστραφεῖς. I challenge this editor to shew any instance of a verb compounded with ὑπὸ which governs a *causal* gen. by virtue of the prep. Meineke, followed by H. R., reads ποία μερίμνη, which C. should have noticed. Wo. keeps the gen. as one of relation (partitive) dependent on

τοῦτο λέγεις. Wu. makes ὑποστραφεῖς = φροντίζων, citing στραφεῖν, Aj. 1117, but this would rather be ἐπιστραφεῖς. If the gen. is kept, I prefer, as in 1854, to explain it as gen. originis, 'from what thought shrinking with a start speak'st thou thus?'

738. ὦ Ζεῦ, τί μου δρᾶσαι βεβούλευσαι πέρι;

C. might have allowed himself a few words to shew the correspondence of rhythm and probable utterance with feeling.

740—1. τὸν δὲ Λαῖον φύσιν

τίν' εἶχε φράζε, τίνα δ' ἀκμήν ἦβης ἔχων.—
μέγας, χνοάζων ἄρτι λευκανθὲς κάρα.

'But say what was the appearance of Laius, and what time of life he had attained?' Or 'How far did he retain the strength of his youth?' Lit. 'What was the strength of youth with him?' C.

C.'s ideas of *literal* translation are often, as here and in v. 728, strange. Not a word is said about the difficulties of ἔχων and ἦβης, which have so exercised commentators, and given birth to so much conjecture. What is the reader taught by a note like this, in which the editor, speaking *solus*, wavers without making a choice? Φύσιν means 'stature,' and is answered by the adj. μέγας, while χνοάζων..... answers the second part of the question. As to ἔχων, it can only be defensible as marking by wild language the agitation of the speaker. But I am strongly tempted to conjecture that ἔχων is a scribe's error, drawn from εἶχε, and that the true reading is ἔτι, which would throw light on the whole passage: 'tell me of Laius, what stature he had, and what vigour of manhood still.' 'Tall, beginning to shew white blossom on his head.'

749. ἃ δ' ἂν ἔρη μαθοῦσ' ἐρῶ.

"The antecedent to ἃ is governed both by μαθοῦσα and ἐρῶ. μαθοῦσα] 'when I understand what it is you ask.'" C.

A 'fourth-form' note like this might well give place to one on the probably true reading ἂν δ' ἔρη.

772—3. τῷ γὰρ ἂν καὶ μείζονι

λέξαιμ' ἂν ἢ σοὶ διὰ τύχης τοιαῦδ' ἰών;

'For whom have I more honourable to whom I should speak in such a crisis of my fortunes?' C.

If it was thought necessary to explain a passage which contains no difficulty, it might seem that the emphatic *καὶ* should have been both expressed and referred to: 'for to whom more *really* important,' &c. See Wunder on Ant. 766. It is passed over also in v. 989, and again in v. 1129.

998. ὦν οὔνεχ' ἡ Κόρινθος ἐξ ἐμοῦ πάλαι
μακρὰν ἀπωκέϊτ'.

'The dwellings of Corinth have been far removed from me,' i.e. 'I have made my dwelling far from Corinth.' C.

'Have been far removed!!' 'I have made!!' Such is the respect for Greek Tense which the readers of this edition are taught to cultivate. The audacious use of Passive construction by Sophocles here can only be represented in English by carrying back the sentence into an Active form, τῆς Κορίνθου ἐγὼ πάλαι μακρὰν ἀπώκουν, i.e. 'I for a long time past continued to dwell at a distance from Corinth' (like an ἄποικος who leaves his μητρόπολις for a new home). No doubt a Perfect might have been written, or a Present (which with πάλαι would have Perf. force). But what we have is an Imperfect; and this expresses that the motive was in operation through a long time continually, that it was true at any given moment.

1144. τί δ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο τοῦπος ἱστορεῖς;

"'What is the particular reason why you ask this?' The interrogative is slightly more emphatic than the relative in such phrases. Cp. El. 316 ἱστόρει τί σοι φίλον. This punctuation is better than τί δ' ἔστι; πρὸς τί κ.τ.λ., because, although surprise is expressed, there is no sufficient occasion for the abrupt question τί δ' ἔστι." C.

Among the many notes proving only too surely how far from trustworthy as an editor of Sophocles Prof. Campbell is, I know none more damnatory than this. We find him here dealing with a most difficult and disputed question on his own single responsibility, deciding it without one reason stated, or one opinion cited on the adverse side, and deciding it, I venture to affirm, wrongly. We find him moreover citing El. v. 316, where again the weight of authority condemns the interpretation he suggests. But what is most surprising in the

matter is this, that he does not clearly see what the doctrine is which he has himself adopted and recommended. For he writes:—‘the *interrogative* is slightly more emphatic than the relative in such phrases.’ The *interrogative*? Does he then suppose that in his phrase ‘the reason why,’ the word *why* is an interrogative and not a relative? He evidently confuses ‘an oblique interrogative’ with ‘a relative,’ and does not perceive (to take this instance), that, when we write ‘tell me why you ask,’ *why* is an oblique interrogative; but when we write, ‘tell me the reason why you ask,’ *why* is a relative. Therefore what he has really adopted here on the ground of being ‘more emphatic’ (a reason often assigned by him for want of any reason), is the use of the form $\tau\acute{\iota}$ as a relative for $\delta\tau\iota$. And such use I, for one, repudiate as impossible in classical Greek. Against it are; L. Wo. R., who edit with double Interrogation. Also H. apparently, but with comma after $\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}$. Also Wu. (who will be cited hereafter), though not printing two questions. Sch. prints two questions here, but takes a different view on El. 316. As to Dindorf, Hermann and Brunck, see Jebb’s note.

First, as to Linwood :

On this place he writes: ‘Signum interrogandi vulgo post $\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}$ positum delevit Dindorfius, ut $\tau\acute{\iota}$ idem sit quod $\delta\tau\iota$. Idem comparat El. 316, $\acute{\omega}\varsigma\ \nu\acute{\upsilon}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\acute{\omicron}\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \sigma\omicron\iota\ \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$; ubi vide quae notabimus.’ Then on El. 316, he reads

$\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\acute{\omicron}\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\ \sigma\omicron\iota\ \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$,

and annotates thus :

“ $\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\acute{\omicron}\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \sigma\omicron\iota\ \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$ vulgo. Dindorfius in eo errasse videtur quod $\tau\acute{\iota}$ pro $\delta\tau\iota$ et hic et alibi positum putet. Cf. ad Oed. T. 1144. $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ et $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$ in interrogatione obliqua saepenumero commutari vix est qui nesciat: sed hujus loci et similium plane diversa est ratio. Neque aliud hoc loco significare posset $\tau\acute{\iota}$ quam *sciscitare quid tibi velis*, quod absurdum est.”

In the passage El. 316, Mr Jebb reads:

$\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\acute{\omicron}\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \sigma\omicron\iota\ \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$;

and annotates thus :

“Make your inquiries: what would you know? Dindorf, *ιστόρει τί σοι φίλον*, ‘ask whatever you like,’ and so Brunck, Hermann and others. Now I believe that in classical Greek *τίς* stands for *ὅστις* only in indirect questions. Thus *εἰπὲ τί σοι φίλον* would be classical; *ιστόρει τί* (whatever) *σοι φίλον* would be unclassical, &c.”

With these opinions I fully concur.

Schn. on El. 316 seems to side with Dindorf.

Hence we see how incumbent it was on Prof. Campbell to discuss the question in his Ed. more fully and carefully.

Wunder does not divide the questions, but he opposes Dindorf's view most strenuously. I subjoin his note, though not fully agreeing with it. The last sentence may be both a warning and a consolation to Prof. Campbell.

“*τί δ' ἔστι πρὸς τί*. Sunt qui putent *πρὸς τί* pro *πρὸς ὃ τι* positum esse, idque ut probent afferunt El. 316: *ὡς νῦν ἀπόντος ἰστόρει τί σοι φίλον*. 1176: *τί δ' ἔσχατος ἀλγος πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἰπὼν κυρεῖς*; aliaque exempla, quae quoniam partim corrupta esse, partim prava interpunctione laborare manifestum est, non opus est ut adscribam. In Sophoclis autem El. v. 316 et 1176, ut concedam potuisse dici, id quod quis Germanorum posuisset, *ὃ τι σοι φίλον* et *πρὸς ὃ τι τοῦτ'* etc., tamen nemo unquam ex illis similibusque locis evincet *τίς* pro *ὅστις* esse positum, quum certissimum sit accommodatissimam illis locis propriam *τίς* pronominis significationem esse. Nam El. v. 316, *ιστόρει, τί σοι φίλον*, hoc sensu dictum esse: quaere, quid tibi placeat ex me scire, vel ex responsione Chori apparet: *καὶ δὴ σ' ἐρωτῶ τοῦ κασιγνήτου τί φῆς, ἥξοντος ἢ μέλλοντος, εἰδέναι θέλω*. Neque vero qui perpenderit amasse Graecos duas interrogationes uno membro efferre, unquam aut El. v. 1176, aut hoc loco *πρὸς τί* pro *πρὸς ὃ τι* positum putabit. Denique vehementer cavendum, ne, quod saepe viris doctis accidisse videmus, membrum interrogationis indirectae cum membro relativo confundas.”

1169. *οἷμοι, πρὸς αὐτῷ γ' εἰμὶ τῷ δεινῷ λέγειν.—*
κάγωγ' ἀκούειν.

“λέγειν is supplementary. ‘I am close on the horror, close on the speaking of it.’” C.

I would not so render, but

‘Woe’s me, I am on the verge of what is horrible to speak.’

‘And I (on the verge of what is horrible) to hear.’

1213. ἐφευρέ σ’ ἄκονθ’ ὁ πάνθ’ ὀρώων χρόνος.

‘Has detected thee although unconscious.’ ‘Has discovered thee in crimes of which thou wast thyself ignorant.’ C.

Can this editor give any good reason why an Aorist should be rendered as a Perfect where English idiom does not require the liberty?

Render: ‘All-seeing time detected thee in guilt involuntary.’

1225. οἶμαι γὰρ οὐτ’ ἂν Ἰστρον οὔτε Φᾶσιν ἂν
νύψαι καθαρμῶ τήνδε τὴν στέγην, ὅσα
κεύθει τὰ δ’ ἀντίκ’ εἰς τὸ φῶς φανεῖ κακὰ
ἐκόντα κούκ ἄκοντα.

Wunder finds difficulties here from not perceiving, what Schneidewin has seen, that τὰ μὲν is to be supplied, per schema Pindaricum, with κεύθει.

I ween nor Ister nor the Phasis’ stream
Can cleanse this roof by washing from the ills
Which now it part conceals, and part shall bring
Forthwith to light, unconscious now no more.

1264. πλεκταῖσιν αἰώραισιν ἐμπεπλεγμένην.

For this ordinary and certain lection C. reads ἐμπεπληγμένην, and renders ‘Having dashed herself into.’ ‘Having struck into.’

The notion of a woman who is found hanging ‘having dashed’ or ‘struck’ herself ‘into a halter’ is so absurd in itself, that I forbear to examine the note farther.

1271. αὐδῶν τοιαῦθ’, ὀθούνεκ’ οὐκ ὀψοιντό νιν
οὐθ’ οἷ’ ἐπασχεν οὐθ’ ὅποι’ ἔδρα κακά,
ἀλλ’ ἐν σκότῳ τὸ λοιπὸν οὐς μὲν οὐκ ἔδει
ὀψοίαθ’, οὐς δ’ ἔχρηζεν οὐ γγνωσσίατο.

Of this passage the following is Prof. Campbell's rendering,

'Saying aloud, Because they should not see the evils of which he had been all this time the victim, or those of which he had been the cause, but in darkness henceforth should see (i.e. should be dark and not see) those whom he ought never to have seen, and fail to know the face of those whom he had desired to know.' C.

and he adds :

'Hermann's conjecture ὄψαιντο derives some plausibility from the tense of ἐπασχεν and ἔδρα.' C.

Here he has, evidently with deliberate καταφρόνησις, made an assertion directly opposite to mine in 1854, when I said that if this imaginary ὄψαιντο (Aor. opt.) were admitted, the verbs ἐπασχεν, ἔδρα, must necessarily have been optative, and also *not* Imperfect. In reply I call upon him to produce instances of past tenses, dependent on a clause with dependent Aor. optative, of which tenses the mood is Indicative and not Optative.

He makes ὁθούνεκα mean 'because.'—Where is the apodosis to this causal clause? Echo answers, Where?

Ὅθούνεκα, like ὅτι, has both senses 'that,' and 'because': and in Soph. it is used seven times as 'because,' always with Indic., and nine times as 'that' (besides this place); eight times with Indic., once (besides this place) with Fut. opt.

The exegesis, which I gave in 1854, I regard as so emphatically and certainly true, that I now reprint it here.

"Wu. and Schn. have unwisely adopted Hermann's conjecture ὄψαιντο, seduced by the sense they *think* arises, viz. 'that, because they had not seen, &c., at least (ἀλλά) they should see, &c.'

The motive ought indeed to be strong, which should induce us to intrude into Attic tragedy a form, of which the supposed instances, even in the old Epic dialect, are very dubious. Were the verb itself a rare one, the conjecture might be more plausible. But, as the verb of seeing is one of the commonest in the language, as the forms ὄψομαι, ὤπωπα, ὤφθην, and again ὁρῶ, εἶδον, &c. meet us so often in tragedy, it is impossible to imagine that ὠψάμην would not have appeared often, were it admissible at all. It is therefore inadmissible.

Again, in the sense sought, not the Aorist optative, but the Imperfect is wanted, the past time referred to being long-continued. Sophocles then would have written *δέρκοιντο*.

There are not less strong objections on the score of syntax. (1) The *only* optative with which *όθούνεκα* is elsewhere found (and in its sense of *that* not *because*) is the Future optative. Oed. Col. 944:

ἦδη δ' όθούνεκ' άνδρα καὶ πατροκτόνον
κἄναγνον οὐ δεξοίατ', οὐδ' ὅτῳ γάμοι
ξυνόντες εύρέθησαν άνόσιοι φίλων.

(2) If a past optative stood in the primary dependence (as this imaginary *όψαιντο*), then the subdependent verbs must be optative also, and not indicative, as *έπασχεν*, *έδρα*, are here. The optative of the Future is not constructed as other optatives (in protasis or apodosis or in subdependent clauses), but stands merely for the indicative of the Future in primary dependence on historical tenses. On this account it does not require optatives in subdependence, but indicatives; (here we have *έπασχεν*, *έδρα*, *έδει*, *έχρηξεν*, and in Oed. Col. 945, *εύρέθησαν*). Therefore *όθούνεκα όψαιντο* would be erroneous in subdependence on *όψοίατο*. For these reasons I reject the fictitious *όψαιντο*, or any other past optative in this place.

Render: 'speaking to this effect; that they (his eyes) should not see either what evils he was enduring, or what he was doing, but in darkness henceforth should see those he would not, and not recognize those he would.' To interpret minutely the second clause, would be little in accordance with the spirit of Sophocles, who has wrapt the sense in awful mystery. Oedipus, when blind, would not recognize his dear living children; but his darkened eyes would be haunted by unwelcome visitors from the world of darkness."

1463. αἶν οὐποθ' ήμή χωρίς έστάθη βοράς
τράπεζ' άνευ τοῦδ' άνδρός.

'From whom my table of food was never set apart to sever them from me. . . . "Ανευ τοῦδ' άνδρός, may be regarded as an explanation of *χωρίς*.' C.

What tautology can be deemed absurd, if this is tolerable? I think I have now discovered the true interpretation: 'Apart from whom my dinner-table was never set without my direction:' i.e. except on very special occasions, when Oedipus himself gave the order. For this use of *ἄνευ*, see Oed. C. 926.

*ἄνευ γε τοῦ κραίνοντος, ὅστις ἦν, χθονὸς
οὐθ' εἶλκον οὐτ' ἂν ἦγον.*

1477. *γνούς τὴν παροῦσαν τέρψιν ἢ σ' εἶχεν πάλαι.*

'Knowing the delight which you now feel, which always possessed you;' i.e. 'Being aware of the pleasure which you have always taken in your children, and thus foreseeing the delight which their coming gives you at this moment.' C.

The explanation last given is right and good, but why (with out any 'lit.' to excuse it) should he have given a *translation* so bald and clumsy? *Γνούς* too is rather 'having formed an opinion of' than 'knowing.' My note of 1854 is:

"Wunder, mistaking these words, badly reads *ἦς ἔχει πάλαι*. Schneidewin appears to understand them rightly, though somewhat vague in his translation. Erfurdt and Linwood correctly: 'quum ex ea voluptate, quam olim percipisti, conjecturam fecissem de præsenti.'"

Translate:

'Having guessed your present pleasure from that which you of old used to feel.' Cp. *πάλαι εἶχεν* with *πάλαι ἀπωκέιτο* in v. 998.

1525—6. *καὶ κράτιστος ἦν ἀνὴρ
ὅστις οὐ ζήλω πολιτῶν καὶ τύχαις ἐπιβλέπων.*

Believing this passage to be fully and beautifully explicable by means of so slight a correction as *ω* for *ο*—ὥς *τις* for *ὅστις*, I do not hesitate to propose it, rendering

'and was a very powerful man for one who did not eye (suspiciously) the emulation (or glory) and fortunes of the citizens.'

C. rightly says that Oedipus was a wise and popular ruler (not an ordinary *τύραννος*), not like Periander (or Tarquin), who cut off the tallest heads of grain or the tallest poppies.

Ἐπιβλέπειν (invidere) to look on with evil eye. For the sense of ζήλος see Aj. 503.

οἷας λατρείας ἀνθ' ὅσου ζήλου τρέφει.

and the passages there cited by Jebb, ζήλον καὶ τιμήν, ζήλος καὶ χαρά.

A conjecturè so natural may have been made by some other scholar: but, if so, I am unaware of the fact.

NOTE on p. 37.

(Character of Antigone.)

I quote the following passage from De Quincey's Works, Vol. XIII. 204, not as adopting his precise words, which some may tax with religious profaneness; but citing them as the strongest contrast to Prof. Campbell's moral profaneness—a sort of antidote to his bane.

“As regards the Antigone in particular, so profoundly do I feel the impassioned beauty of her situation in connexion with her character, that long ago, in a work of my own * * * * I call up Antigone to this shadowy stage by the apostrophe, ‘Holy heathen, daughter of God, before God was known, flower from Paradise after Paradise was closed; who quitting all things for which flesh languishes, safety and honour, a palace and a home, didst make thyself a houseless pariah, lest the poor pariah king, thy outcast father, should want a hand to lead him in his darkness, or a voice to whisper comfort in his misery; angel, that badst depart for ever the glories of thy own bridal day, lest he that had shared thy nursery in childhood should want the honours of a funeral; idolatrous yet Christian Lady, who in the spirit of martyrdom trodst alone the yawning billows of the grave, flying from earthly hopes, lest everlasting despair should settle upon the grave of thy brother,’ &c. In fact, though all the groupings, and what I would call permanent attitudes of the Grecian stage, are majestic, there is none that, to my mind, towers into such affecting grandeur as this final revelation, through Antigone herself, and through her own dreadful death, of the tremendous woe that destiny had suspended over her house.”

CAMBRIDGE, 1873.

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